U.S. Asylum Law Applied to Battered Women Fleeing Islamic Countries by Aliaskari, Mahsa
U.S. ASYLUM LAW APPLIED TO
BATTERED WOMEN FLEEING ISLAMIC
COUNTRIES
MAHSA ALIASKAPJ
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 232
II. ESTABLISHING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES ........................ 233
A. Withholding of Removal ........................................................ 235
B. Discretionary Grant of Asylum ............................................... 237
III. SEEKING ASLUM AS A BATTERED WOMAN ................................ 239
A. Establishing Refugee Status ................................................... 242
1. Political O pinion ........................................................... 242
2. Membership in a Particular Social Group ................... 246
B. Effects of Recent Decisions on the Definition of Membership
in a Particular Social Group ................................................. 251
IV. BATTERED WOMEN ESCAPING THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
O F IRAN ..................................................................................... 255
A. The Effects of a Theocracy on the Treatment and Rights of
W om en ................................................................................. 257
1. Islamic Law and Family ................................................. 257
a. M arriage .................................................................... 258
b. D ivorce ...................................................................... 260
c. Custody ..................................................................... 264
2. Consequences of Islamic Doctrines That Place
Women in a Subordinate Position ............................... 266
a. Mina and Fatima's Story .......................................... 267
b. Widespread Abuse and Silence ................................ 270
B. Applying U.S. Asylum Laws to Claims of Women Fleeing
Islamic Countries .................................................................. 271
1. Applying U.S. Standards to Battered Iranian
Women Seeking Asylum ............................................... 272
* J.D. Candidate, Washington College of Law, American University, 2000. I wish to thank
the staff and editors of the Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law for their hard work in
preparing this piece for publication. My thanks also goes out to my family and friends for their
support, encouragement, and patience.
232 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY& THE LAW [Vol. 8:2
a. Establishing Grounds of Persecution ...................... 274
b. Establishing the Existence of Persecution .............. 277
V. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................. 280
I. INTRODUCTION
Every year, millions of men and women flee their homelands tb
seek refuge in any country willing to accept them.' In 1997 alone, the
United States received 84,776 applications from individuals seeking
asylum with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
Some of these applicants are women escaping countries not willing to
protect them from their husband's infliction of physical abuse."
When these women finally leave their homes, they do not always leave
alone; sometimes they take their children with them.4 For women
who escape Islamic states, such an act may not only break the law, but
it could also place their lives and freedom in danger if they return.5
This Comment analyzes U.S. asylum laws and procedures as
applied to battered women who escape Islamic states. Part II
provides a brief overview of U.S. asylum law and history. Part III
1. See Roger P. Winter, The Year in Review, in WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1998, 14, 14
(presenting statistics on refugee and asylum seekers worldwide). As of December 31, 1997,
there were 13,600,000 refugees and asylum seekers worldwide. World Refugee Statistics, in WORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY 1998, 2, 3.
2. See Hiram A. Ruiz, Bill Frelicket,Jona Mason, Katie Hope & Susan Grogg, Americas and
the Caribbean, in WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1998, 222, 237 (reviewing the number of refugees
seeking asylum in the United States, the refugee resettlement programs, the granting of
temporary protection status, the expedited removal procedures enacted in 1996, and other
statutory changes).
3. See generally Patricia A. Seith, Note, Escaping Domestic Violence: Asylum as a Means of
Protection forBattered Women, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1804, 1810 (1997) (arguing that economic and
political institutions combined with a patriarchal belief system make abusive relationships
appear natural, morally just and sacred, and when the government is unwilling or unable to
stop the violence and the subordination of women, domestic violence becomes public
persecution); Judith Armatta, Getting Beyond the Law's Complicity in Intimate Violence Against
Women, 33 WII.AMETTE L. REV. 773, 782 (1997) (analyzing the effects of laws on women in
different areas of the world when the laws embody social mores that promote and sanction wife
abuse).
4. See Armatta, supra note 3, at 794-99 (stating that abusive husbands often use child
custody and economic considerations to control women). In addition, "laws designed to
prevent custodial kidnapping can be used as tools of control ... [when] the laws do not take
domestic violence into account." Id. at 798.
5. See Iran's Constitution, in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD I (Albert
P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992) [hereinafter Constitution) (detailing laws relating to
women and the family, and the government's sanctions for those who do not abide by the laws);
see also KristinJ. Miller, Comment, Human Rights of Women in Iran: The Universalistic Approach and
the Relativist Response, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 779, 783-86 (1996) (describing the changes in the
law once the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came into power and instituted Islamic law as the
law of the country, how these changes affected women in Iran, and how the government
responded to women who did not conform with the new Islamic laws governing the state).
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analyzes the application of U.S. asylum laws to battered women in
general. Part IV discusses the application of these laws to battered
women fleeing Islamic states. Because of the varying degrees in
which different governments apply Islamic law,6 this Comment
focuses on battered women escaping the Islamic State of Iran.
Finally, Part V provides suggestions for the direction the United
States should move when dealing with asylum cases involving battered
women who flee their countries with their children.
II. ESTABLISHING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES
Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980 ("Refugee Act")7  in
order to conform U.S. immigration laws with the provisions set forth
in the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees ("Protocol").8 The Refugee Act expanded the definition of
refugee.9
The Act defines "refugee" as:
Any person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality, or in the case of a person having no
nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of, that country because of persecution
6. See infra Part Ill and accompanying text. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Garnal M.
Badr, Saad EI-Fishawy, Farooq A. Hassan & Erik Peterson, Islamic Law, 76 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 55 (surveying Islamic international law).
7. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) [hereinafter Refugee Act] (codified at
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1994) [hereinafter INA]).
8. Jan. 31, 1976, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol]. The United
States became a signatory to the Protocol in 1968. Id. By signing the Protocol, the United
States also became bound by all of the substantive provisions of the 1951 United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436
(1987) (analyzing the legislative purpose for the 1980 Act in an attempt to define the standards
for evaluating claims of persecution); ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN,
IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 718, 760 (1995) (reviewing the controversy over the
definition of refugee and the standards used in granting asylum or withholding deportation;
the authors also review asylum procedures and the impact of new legislation on asylum
seekers); 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6260, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention] (entering into force Apr. 22,
1954).
9. The President determines the annual admission of refugees "before the beginning of
the fiscal year and after appropriate consultation ..... [the] admission [of] a specific number
of refugees in excess of such [predetermined] number is justified by humanitarian concerns or
is otherwise [found to be] in the national interest." 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1994). See generally
ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 8, at 735-39 (discussing the executive branch's use of its
parole power to grant asylum to refugees). Prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act, this
power was discretionary and quotas were set on the number of refugees allowed to enter the
United States. Id This power, however, did not technically grant admission to the alien, who
constructively remained at the border and was subject to exclusion at any time. Id.
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or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.'0
The Act's definition of refugee is almost identical to the 1951
Convention definition."
Currently, individuals seeking asylum in the United States can do
so under two different provisions, either section 241 (b) (3) or section
208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). Under these
provisions, an applicant can file either a defensive or affirmative
application. i Once an alien is in the United States, and the INS finds
him or her out of status, the INS initiates deportation proceedings
against that individual. 4  In this instance, the alien can file a
defensive application for a withholding of removal under section
241 (b) (3) of the INA.'5 Aliens who enter the United States can make
affirmative applications by filing for a discretionary grant of asylum
10. INA § 101 (a) (42) (A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) (1994). "The Attorney General may
grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum in accordance with the requirements and
procedures established by the Attorney General under this section if the Attorney General
determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 101 (a) (42) (A)." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (also referred to as INA§ 208(a)).
11. The 1951 Convention defines "refugee" as any person who:
Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926
and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10
February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of
the International Refugee Organization ....
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.
19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. at 138. The distinction in the Refugee Act between the 1951
Convention definition and Congress' is the inclusion of "past persecution" as a factor in
determining refugee status.
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (conforming U.S. law to the 1967 Protocol and 1951 United
Nations Convention by creating a provision that restricts the removal of an alien to a country
where the alien's life or freedom will be threatened); 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (detailing the definition
of refugee and the standard used for a discretionary grant of asylum); see also Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. at 421 (involving a Nicaraguan citizen who entered the United States and filed for
withholding of deportation and a grant of asylum due to the persecution she would face on
account of her political views if returned to Nicaragua).
13. ALEINIKOFF & MARTiN, supra note 8, at 764.
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251 ("[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if
the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that
country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.").
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under section 208 of the INA-
However, before an alien can apply for either form of relief, she
must overcome the expedited removal procedures of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRAIRA) . This means that when an alien enters the United States
and seeks asylum, an asylum officer must first determine whether the
alien has a "credible fear of persecution."18 Since the acceptance of
domestic violence as a form of persecution is novel and not yet widely
recognized, this new procedure creates an insurmountable obstacle
for battered women seeking asylum. 9
A. Withholding of Removal
When an alien applies for withholding of removal, the alien must
establish that her life or freedom is threatened in the country of
origin on account of one of the following five factors: (1) race, (2)
religion, (3) nationality, (4) membership in a particular social group,
or (5) political opinion." Once an applicant establishes a threat to
her life or freedom pursuant to the principles of nonrefoulment,
2 1
16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 ("An alien who is physically present in the United States...
irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum .... ").
17. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 is Division
C of the Defense Department Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996).
18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (1994) (describing "credible fear of persecution" as the
"significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in
support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien
could establish eligibility for asylum... "). Administrative and judicial review of the asylum
officer's decision or the decision of an immigrationjudge are very limited. See INA § 235(b) (1),
8 U.S.C. § 1225(B) (1); INA § 242(a) (2) (A); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (A); INA § 242(e), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(e). See generally Philip G. Schrag & Michele R. Pistone, The New Asylum Rule: Not Yet a
Model of Fair Procedure, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 267, 270 (1997) (discussing the IIRAIRA and its
implication, and arguing that the new procedures make asylum harder to obtain).
19. See generay Seith, supra note 3, at 1817 n.75 (discussing the impact of new procedures).
The INS guidelines issued in 1995 should assist asylum officers in making determinations
during expedited removal procedures, which are more sensitive to female applicants whose
asylum claims are based on gender related persecution. Id. These guidelines, however, are
only recommendations and asylum officers continue to make determinations based on
stereotypes and biases. See, e.g., Gender Guidelines, infra note 58, and accompanying text;
Angoucheva v. INS, 106 F.3d 761,793 n.2 (7th Cir. 1997) (commenting on the INS's argument
that sexual assault is attributable to sexual attraction); Matter of Sharmin, I. &J. Dec. (Sept. 27,
1996), reported in 75 INTERPRETR RELEAsES 174 (Jan. 27, 1997) (reviewing INS's dosing
arguments, which referred to domestic violence as a "family matter" and noting that the
statement was in direct contradiction to the INS gender guidelines).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
21. See AIEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 8, at 763 (stating that the concept of
nonrefoulment obligates countries to provide or find a safe country for persons seeking asylum
when it is proven that return to the applicant's home country of origin will result in hardship).
According to the Refugee Convention, "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return
('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
236 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 8:2
the Attorney General is required to withhold deportation and either
grant asylum, or deport the applicant to any other country where the
applicant will be safe.n
Since granting withholding of deportation 23 is mandatory, the
applicant must demonstrate that a "clear probability" of persecution
exists. 24 In making this determination, objective evidence is utilized
to establish that if returned, "it is more likely than not that he/she
will be subjected to persecution."2' To establish this likelihood, the
applicant must present evidence demonstrating that: (1) through
punishment, the persecutor seeks to overcome a belief or
characteristic held by the applicant; (2) the persecutor is aware of the
belief or characteristic, or "could easily become aware"; (3) the
persecutor is capable of enforcing the punishment; and (4) that the
persecutor is inclined to punish the alien. 6
When an applicant establishes the truth of her allegations by a
preponderance of the evidence, she only procures the right not to be
sent back to the persecuting country (nonrefoulment) .27 Therefore,
particular social group or political opinion." Refugee Convention, supra note 8, at art. 33. See
also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 429 (discussing the mandatory duty of nonrefoulment found in
the Refugee Convention and the legislatures' attempt to remove the Attorney General's
discretion in withholding proceedings); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 408 (1984) (discussing the
legislative history and purpose of § 243(h)-the predecessor to § 241(b) (3)-and the
appropriate standard governing applications for withholding of deportation).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
23. In this instance, the granting of asylum only means that the Attorney General cannot
send the applicant back to a country that poses a threat to the applicant's safety and life. See 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) ("The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien.., to a
country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.").
24. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 429 (discussing the dear probability standard); Sanchez-
Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1578 (9th Cir. 1986) (declaring that aliens from El Salvador who
claimed fear of persecution as young, urban, working class males of military age who never
served in the military and never supported the government of El Salvador, failed to establish a
"clear probability" of persecution based on one of the five statutory factors delineated in the
INA because the petitioner's particular social group encompassed a large division of the
population and the petitioner failed to present evidence of persecution directed at him
personally). Aliens seeking asylum or withholding of deportation must show two things: (1)
they must meet the evidentiary burdens of proof and persuasion as to the facts, and (2) they
must meet the statutory standards of eligibility set by pertinent provisions of the INA. Matter of
Acosta, 19 1. &N. Dec. 211,211 (BIA 1985).
25. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 422, 407 (1984); see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430
(accepting the Supreme Court's construction of the clear-probability standard in Stevic and
stating that the language of § 243(h) requires objective evidence proving likelihood of
persecution but that no subjective element is present); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 236
(accepting and applying the standard used in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca for what will constitute a
.clear probability").
26. Matter ofAcosta, 19I. & N. Dec. at 212.
27. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251; see also Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 722 (9th Cir. 1990)
(stating that "withholding of deportation only protects an individual from deportation to a
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applicants who apply for withholding of deportation concurrently
apply for a discretionary grant of asylum to ensure that they will be
able to remain in the United States and not be deported to a safe
28third country.
B. Discretionary Grant of Asylum
Section 208 of the INA authorizes the Attorney General to grant
asylum to aliens.29 Unlike withholding of removal, section 208 is a
discretionary grant of asylum that also gives an alien the right to
apply for permanent residency in the United States under INA
section 209. s° To qualify for asylum under section 208, the Attorney
General must first deem the applicant a refugee as the term is
defined in section 101 (a) (42) of the INA.3' The Supreme Court's
interpretation of the statutory procedures and standards for
qualifying as a refugee under this section requires both a subjective
and objective demonstration of a "well-founded fear" of persecution.
specific county while asylum allows him to have his status adjusted to that of a lawful permanent
resident").
28. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) ("An asylum application shall be deemed to constitute at the
same time an application for withholding of removal .... Where a determination is made that
an applicant is ineligible to apply for asylum under § 208(a)(2) of the Act, an asylum
application shall be construed as an application for withholding of removal."); see also Canas-
Segovia, 902 F.2d at 722 (declaring that asylum and withholding of deportation are sought at the
same time and that relief under each is different).
29. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (stating that the provision applies only to aliens who are physically
present in the United States).
30. Id. § 1159.
31. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (defining refugee).
32. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427-28 (1987) (disagreeing with the BIA
ruling in Matter of Acosta, and ruling that the "well-founded" standard for asylum under § 208 is
more generous than the "clear-probability" standard found in § 241(b) (3); therefore, the more
likely than not requirement does not govern applications for asylum under § 208); Matter of
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987) (ruling that the two standards are different,
Congress intended to make a distinction between the two, and the Supreme Court overruled
portions of Matter of Acosta through its decision in Cardoza-Fonseca). Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca, the courts were split on the issue. Cf Yousifv. INS, 794 F.2d
236, 243 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that the well-founded fear standard is more generous);
Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir. 1985) (declaring "well-founded fear"
to be more generous); Matter of Sanchez & Escobar, 19 I. & N. Dec. 276 (BIA 1985) (denying
asylum because the evidence presented only pointed to the general conditions of violence in El
Salvador and not to the applicant's persecution based on any of the statutorily defined factors,
but accepting the Ninth Circuit's distinction between "well-founded fear" and "clear
probability"). But see Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977) (stating that the two
standards converge); Sotto v. INS, 748 F.2d 832, 836 (3d Cir. 1984) (agreeing that no difference
exists between the standards for asylum and those for withholding of deportation); Matter of
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985) (applying the case law and standards used prior to the
enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980 and deciding that the two standards converge). To prove
"well-founded" fear, an applicant must establish that there is a real chance of her becoming a
victim of persecution. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430 (reviewing the different phrases used
in the withholding of removal versus the granting of asylum to interpret the language that sets
the standard for determining eligibility found in § 208).
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The Supreme Court discussed and adopted the subjective and
objective standards in Cardoza-Fonseca v. iNS33 The Court stated that
the "subjective mental state of the alien" is an element of the "well
founded fear of persecution" standard.34 Therefore, even when the
practical chances of an applicant's persecution are less than fifty
percent, the fear may still be well-founded.35 Both the objective and
subjective evidence is used to make the determination.0 The Court,
however, did not define "well-founded fear."3  Instead, the Court
urged for a case by case determination. s
In determining what evidence is admitted and how much evidence
is sufficient to establish refugee status, courts review the legislative
history of the Refugee Acte9 as well as the wording and history of the
United Nations (U.N.) provisions0 on which the Refugee Act is
based.41  The factors found within these documents assist courts in
determining whether a subjective or objective fear of persecution is
applied. Asylum is then granted only if the applicant also proves
that the persecution is based on one of the five factors delineated in
the INA.4' Therefore, whether a battered woman qualifies for asylum
33. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
34. Id. at 431.
35. Id.
36. Id. The subjective element requires a showing that the applicant's fear is genuine, and
the objective element requires a showing by credible, direct, and specific evidence in the facts
to support the applicant's claim that she fears persecution. See Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d
1488, 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1986); Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that "fear is a state of apprehension or anxiety not subject to rational measurement"
but rather on some basis in reality, thus, an irrational apprehension is insufficient to meet the
burden of proof); see also Yousif, 794 F.2d at 243-44 (holding that an applicant can gain asylum
based on a subjective fear of persecution, but the assertions of fear must be supported by
objective evidence); Garcia-Ramos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that the
subjective fear must be based in reality or in the reasonable possibility of persecution).
37. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447.
38. Id. at 448. See also Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 441 (BIA 1987) (agreeing
with the Supreme Court on determining the definition of the standard on a case by case basis).
39. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified at Immigration and
NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 etseq. (1994)).
40. See Cardoza-Fonsea, 480 United States at 436-40 (making determination after discussing
current legislation and its basis on U.N. documents and their history).
41. The changes the Refugee Act makes are used to show the purpose of the new asylum
section. The courts also refer to the refugee definition used in the Refugee Convention and
the Protocol, as well as the language and guidelines of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (the
Handbook). See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428-43; McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th
Cir. 1981). But see Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that it was clear that
Congress intended to bring the United States into conformity with the Protocol, but that the
history of the Protocol was not very helpful in this instance because "membership in a particular
social group" was added to the Protocol as an afterthought).
42. See generaUy Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428-43.
43. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also Sharif v. INS, 87 F.3d 932, 935 (7th
238
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will depend on a court's assessment of the woman's characteristics,
environment, situation, and the basis of her persecution.
III. SEEKING ASYLUM AS A BATTERED WOMAN 4
Asylum involves a two step process. An applicant must first show
eligibility for asylum, and then she must prove that the INS should
use its discretion in favor of granting her asylum. 5 When a battered
woman applies for asylum, she can show eligibility by claiming
persecution on the basis of her political opinions or her membership
in a particular social group.4 6 The applicant must then establish that
she has a "well-founded fear" of being subjected to persecution.4 ' To
do so, she must present specific facts establishing that she is actually a
victim of persecution or that she has a good reason to fear being
singled out for persecution on account of one of the five factors listed
in the NA.4 8
The first step of the process requires evidence that the applicant
meets the definition of refugee. 9 In Matter of Acosta,5 ° the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") defined some of the language used in
this definition." "Fear" is defined as the "genuine apprehension or
Cir. 1996) (asserting that in addition to the burden of showing a subjective fear that is
objectively reasonable, an applicant for asylum must also establish that the persecution stems
from one of the five motives); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1575 (9th Cir. 1986)
(denying asylum because petitioner did not show that the particular social group he defined
was cognizable under the INA or that the petitioner qualified as a member of that social
group).
44. For purposes of this Comment, a battered woman is one who has experienced violence
as it is defined in Article One of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women (DEVAW), "'violence against women' means any act of gender-based violence that
results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in
public or in private life." Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, GA. Res.
48/104,48 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993).
45. See ALEiNmOFF & MARTIN, supra note 8, at 764-67 (discussing the asylum procedure).
46. See generally Seith, supra note 3, at 1819 (reviewing asylum procedures and stating that
social group and political opinion are the two categories on which domestic violence claims are
usually based); Patricia F. Warren, Comment, Women are Human: Gender-Based Persecution is a
Human Rights Violation Against Women, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 281 (1994) (discussing the
limitations of U.S. immigration and asylum as it is applied to victims of gender-based
persecution).
47. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 8, at 764-67.
48. See Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 572-79 (7th Cir. 1984) (reviewing in detail the
burden placed on an applicant and the type of evidence needed to establish persecution: must
be specific, show reasonable probability, and good reason to fear persecution); Matter of
Mogharrab4 19 1. & N. Dec. at 443 (applying the standard set by Munoz).
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1158; INA § 101(a) (42).
50. 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
51. 19 1. & N. Dec. at 212.
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awareness of danger in another country .... , and "persecution" as
"harm or suffering inflicted on an individual to punish him for
possessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to
overcome... ."" In addition, the reasonable person standard is most
likely used to determine the woman's fear. 4 This standard creates an
additional problem when judges are not aware of the psychological
effects of battering or of the social values inherent in cultures that
subordinate women through economic and governmental
institutions.5 Therefore, a battered woman who seeks asylum after
escaping the violence in her home has a difficult time proving that
she meets the definition of refugee under INA section 101 (a) (42)."
In addition to presenting evidence of her fear and persecution, the
applicant must also prove the existence of a nexus between the
persecution and the persecutors grounds for punishing her. 7 In an
52. Id.
53. Id. Some courts have defined persecution in even greater detail as:
[the infliction of suffering or harm, under government sanction, upon
persons who differ in a way regarded as offensive..., in a manner
condemned by civilized governments. The harm or suffering need not be
physical, but may take other forms, such as the deliberate imposition of
severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing,
employment or other essentials of life ....
Matter of Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 456-57 (BIA 1983). See also Abdel-Masieh v. INS, 3
F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 1996) (adopting Laipenieks definition of persecution); Sharif v. INS, 87 F.3d
932, 935 (7th Cir. 1996) (accepting and applying the Acosta definition of persecution, and
adding that the acts constituting persecution do not have be life threatening to be considered
persecution); Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that persecution is the
infliction of suffering or harm based on what is regarded as offensive, including mental and
physical suffering); Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing whether
punishment the petitioner will face if he returns to Cuba can constitute "persecution").
54. See Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 445 (setting the reasonable person standard
in asylum proceedings); In re Fauziya Kasinga, I. & N. Dec. 3278 (BIA 1996), available in 1996
WL 379826 (adopting the standard set in Mogharrabi and declaring that the burden is on the
applicant to establish that a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear persecution.
The BIA granted asylum to the applicant, who claimed persecution based on membership in
the particular social group of women in her tribe who had not undergone the process of female
genital mutilation (FGM)); Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the BIA had to review the petitioner's application for asylum based on new evidence that
enabled her to establish the reasonableness of her fears if she returned to El Salvador due to
the publicity her case had generated in her home country).
55. See Isabel Marcus, Terrorism in the Home, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE
11, 20 (1994) (discussing the prevalence of domestic violence in all cultures and society, and its
support through political and economic theory that reinforces the family as a hierarchical entity
in which the man is the "designated head... whose will prevails ... ."); see also supra note 3 and
accompanying text (discussing culture and the construction of abusive relationships); infra Part
I and accompanying notes (detailing the position of women in Iran).
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
57. The applicant must fulfill the "on account of" requirement of the INA definition of
refugee. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,
482 (1992) (discussing the requirement in the context of a political opinion claim, the court
emphasized that prosecution must be threatened or inflicted "on account of the victim's
240
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attempt to improve the adjudication of these types of cases and assist
in the development of a nexus, the INS recently issued guidelines for
Asylum Officers adjudicating such claims."5 In these guidelines,
domestic violence is included as a basis for establishing that a woman
experienced "past persecution on account of one or more of the five
grounds..." delineated in the INA! 9  However, whether or not
asylum officers will utilize these guidelines when adjudicating the
claims of battered women has yet to be determined.6° In addition,
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is not required to apply or
enforce these guidelines when they review the asylum determinations
of immigration judges and asylum officers.61 Further, even when the
political opinion.... "); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 226 (BIA 1985) (stating that the
harm inflicted on the victim was for the purpose of punishing the victim for having one or
more of the protected characteristics found in the INA).
58. The guidelines are intended to ensure consistency and "enhance the ability of U.S.
Asylum Officers to more sensitively deal with substantive and procedural aspects of gender-
related claims, irrespective of country origin." Memorandum from Office of International
Affairs, to All INS Asylum Officers and HQASM Coordinators, Phyllis Coven (May 26, 1995)
[hereinafter Gender Guidelines] (on file with author). The Gender Guidelines state that
gender-based claims must be evaluated through existing international human rights
instruments. Id. at 1. Specifically, the Gender Guidelines refer to the 1979 Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
adopted in 1985 (UNHCR), and the 1993 Canadian Guidelines. Id. at 1. The INS
memorandum used the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women (Geneva, July 1991) and Canada's guidelines issued
in 1993. See id. at 1. The guidelines advise asylum adjudicators to consider an applicant's
country of origin, the treatment of women by the law, the political, social and economic rights
of women, the incidence of reported violence against women, and the consequences of
returning. See id. at 4; U.N. Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (declaring that discrimination against women violates principles of
equality of rights and serves as an obstacle for women's participation in political, social,
economic, and cultural life); U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women,
GA. Res. 104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1994)
(recognizing effects of violence on women that lead to the domination and discrimination of
women and detailing the definition of violence in all its forms, and women's entitlement to
equal protection of rights and fundamental freedoms); Angoucheva v. INS, 106 F.3d 761, 793
n.2 (7th Cir. 1997) (concurring opinion) (admonishing the BIA decision that denied asylum to
a sexual assault victim because the assault was attributed to sexual attraction); Fisher v. INS, 79
F.3d 955, 968 (9th Cir. 1993) (Noonan, J., dissenting) (stating that the INS guidelines are
intended to develop asylum laws in the United States "with special attention to the problems of
women oppressed on account of their nonconformity with the moral codes of a rigorous
regime," and that there are still elements within the INS that have not assimilated to the spirit
of these guidelines).
59. Gender Guidelines, supra note 58, at 8. Other examples of events that are directed at
girls and women that can be used to show persecution under the guidelines include rape,
sexual abuse, infanticide, and genital mutilation. IdL
60. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (analyzing impact of new procedures); infra
notes 148-53 and accompanying text (discussing a recent BIA denial of asylum to a battered
woman from Guatemala).
61. See In re R-A-, Interim Decision 3402 (1999 BIA), available in 1999 WL 424364
(overturning the ImmigrationJudge's grant of asylum to a Guatamalan woman who was a victim
of domestic abuse). The Immigration Judge accepted the respondent's arguments in favor of
asylum on the basis of the woman's political opinion and membership in a particular social
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BIA applies these guidelines or recommends their application
through its decisions, the determinations are not binding precedent
unless expressly stated in the opinion. 12
A. Establishing Refugee Status
1. Political Opinion
To gain asylum on the basis of political opinion, an applicant must
show that there is a connection between the persecution she suffers
and her political opinion.6s The applicant must present direct or
circumstantial evidence proving the causal connection between the
persecution and the political opinion.6 Even though in the case of a
battered woman where the persecutor is a private actor, the woman
can still claim persecution on account of her political opinion when
the government refuses to, or is unable to control the private actor."
Matter of Pierre6 was one of the first BIA decisions to accept the
theory that an alien can qualify for relief as a refugee even when the
persecution is at the hands of an individual who is not connected
with the government. 67 However, the respondent must first show that
the government is unwilling or unable to control the persecuting
individual or group.68 In Matter of Pierre, the respondent was unable
to gain asylum because the BIA decided that she did not present
group. Id.
62. See Seith, supra note 3, at 1807 n.13 (discussing decisions of the BIA and the fact that
they are not binding precedent of future cases); see also Matter of A- and Z, IJ Dec. (Dec. 20,
1994) (Arlington, VA), reported in 72 INTERPRETER RELEAs 521 (Apr. 17, 1995) (full text of
decision on file with author) [hereinafter Matter of A and 2] (declaring decision not binding
after granting asylum to a mother and son who suffered emotional and physical abuse at the
hands of the petitioner's husband).
63. The burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate through objective evidence her
reasonable fear of persecution. See supra note 36 and accompany text (discussing the
requirement of both objective and subjective evidence to demonstrate that the applicant
possess a "well-founded" fear of persecution); supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text
(discussing the nexus requirement in asylum claims).
64. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574 (9th Cir. 1986) (requiring applicant to
establish fear of persecution "through specific, direct, and concrete evidence that he personally
would be singled out for persecution on account of one of [the] statutory factors, or that there
is a reasonable possibility of such persecution."); see also Part IIA (discussing the requirement of
basing an asylum claim of withholding of deportation on one of the five grounds found in the
INA, and the clear probability standard for demonstrating persecution or fear of persecution);
Part ll.B (reviewing the '"vell-founded fear" standard of persecution requiring subjective and
objective evidence for a discretionary grant of asylum).
65. See McMullen v. INS, 58 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the actions of a group
that a government cannot or is unwilling to control can be considered in asylum claims).
66. 15 1. & N. Dec. 461 (BIA 1975).
67. Id. at 462.
68. See id.
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enough evidence to support her claim that the government of Haiti
would not intervene to prevent or punish her husband for
threatening and attempting to kill her. 9 In addition, the BIA
concluded that even if the respondent could show that the
government was unable or unwilling to stop her husband, she still
would not qualify for asylum because "[n]ot every unlawful act of
individual harassment will amount to persecution within the meaning
of' the statute. ° Because the husband's motivation was considered
strictly personal, the respondent could not be protected.7  This
public/private distinction created a justification for the lack of
government protection; therefore, it is imperative that violence
against women is recognized as a violation of women's human
rights. 72  Such violent acts constitute persecution regardless of
whether the government or a private actor, who the government does
not control, is committing the act.73
Some courts also describe politically motivated persecution as a
government's infliction of harm, or suffering on an individual in an
effort to overcome his or her political opinion.7 The individual's
belief causing "him to be the object of persecution," and not the
specific political end the persecution serves is the motivation
69. See id. The BIA arrived at this conclusion even though there was evidence that the
respondent's husband was a deputy in the Haitian Government and petitioner's cousin testified
to hearing respondent's husband threaten to physically harm her. Id.
70. 15 1. & N. Dec. 461,463 (BIA 1975).
71. Id.at 461.
72. See Donna Sullivan, The Public/Pivate Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in
WoNLAN'S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS 126, 126 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995); see also
Karen Bower, Recognizing Violence Against Women as Persecution on the Basis of Membership in a
Particular Social Group, 7 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 173, 186 (1993) (discussing the violence many
women encounter in countries where the government condones or ignores domestic violence,
dowry-deaths, and wife burning because they are considered private matters, or because the
laws making the abuse legal are not enforced). The violence women experience is often equal
to, if not worse than, the persecution and torture those in detention face. Id Yet, the state and
the international community do not see the violations against the physical and psychological
integrity of these women as violations of the women's basic human rights. Id. at 188.
73. Id.
74. SeeIn re Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 212 (BIA 1985) (declaring persecution
as a broad concept that could include governmental measures compelling individuals to engage
in conduct not physically harmful, but abhorrent to the individual's beliefs); Fatin v. INS, 12
F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993) (considering whether an Iranian woman who had to wear
traditional Islamic dress faced persecution because of the harshness of the requirement and
penalties for violation; the court declared that the penalties could constitute persecution if she
in fact broke the code and the punishments were inflicted on her); see also Hernandez-Ortiz v.
INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that when an individual or group has not
engaged in criminal activity or conduct that creates a legitimate basis for a government to
punish, then one can presume that politics are motivating the government's actions); Bolanos-
Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984) (declaring that an applicant's political choices
and beliefs are not necessary in an analysis of his request for asylum).
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initiating these efforts.7s In Lazo-Majano v. iNS,76 the Ninth Circuit,
for the first time, recognized the resistance of a woman to the male
domination prevalent in her country as an expression of a political
opinion. The action of an individual or a government that reveals
the goal of suppressing opposition to social norms is an act of
persecution based on the woman's opposition to her status and
treatment.78 In addition, the Third Circuit indicated in Fatin v. iN 9
that harsh penalties for disobedience of gender-specific laws or
repressive social norms could amount to persecution on account of
one's beliefs."'
Therefore, a battered woman who challenges her husband and
seeks protection from the government can argue fear of persecution
based on her political opinion."' She can do this when her actions
lead to her persecution because they are viewed as a threat to the
social norms of society, to the legitimacy of her husband's power, and
to the governments' explicit or implicit approval of that position.82
75. In reMatter ofAcosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. at 235.
76. 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
77. Id. at 1435. The court stated that when the petitioner, Olivia, fled her male persecutor
who raped her, she asserted a political opinion, and exposed herself to persecution for that
assertion. Id. Therefore, the "[p]ersecutor threatened her because of her political opinion."
Id. But see Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1987) (denying petitioner's
claim because the threats to the petitioner and her rape were personally motivated, and no
indication was given that the attacker acted from an interest in the petitioner because of her
political opinions; instead, the incident was a "type of civil strife" not covered by the statute),
78. See Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the persecutor, a
sergeant who raped the applicant, asserted the political opinion "that a man has a right to
dominate" a woman, and that she may not hold an opinion contradictory to his). The actions
and statements of the sergeant were also considered to reflect a general animosity towards
women and the assertion of the desire to suppress opposition to that animosity. Id.
79. 12 F.3d at 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
80. See id. at 1241-43 (deciding that an Iranian woman who objected to the gender-specific
laws restricting women did not show a likelihood of persecution because she was willing to
abide by the laws, but declaring that "if a woman's opposition to the ... laws in question is so
profound that she could choose to suffer the severe consequences of noncompliance, her
beliefs my well be characterized as 'so fundamental to [her] identity or conscience that [they]
ought not to be required to be changed.'" (quotingAcoste, 19 1. & N. Dec. at 234)); cf Sharif v.
INS, 87 F.3d 932, 936 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying Iranian woman's claim for asylum even though
she claimed that returning to Iran would result in her persecution because of her family status
and her status as a westernized woman; the court concluded that because she lived in
conformity in the past and would probably do so in the future, there was no fear of future
persecution).
81. The UNHCR Handbook defines "political opinion" as "opinions not tolerated by the
authorities, which are critical of their policies or methods." Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, in 10
IMMIGR. L. & PROC. 28, at para. 80 [hereinafter Refugee Handbook]. Thus, a woman's
opposition to laws that do not provide her with a remedy could be considered a political
opinion. Id.
82. See Pamela Goldberg, An)place But Home Asylum in the United States for Women Fleeing
Intimate Violence, 26 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 565, 598 (1993) (arguing that fleeing intimate violence
is an expression of a woman's rejection of the social norms thatjustify and grant the man the
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The treatment she receives in response to her "rebellious" actions,
which can lead to harsh penalties and opposition from private and
public actors, equate to persecution on account of her political
beliefs.83
In a male-dominated society, the actions of a woman who leaves
her husband, reports her husband to the authorities, or disobeys her
husband in the home, can constitute violations of deeply rooted
beliefs in the sacredness of the family and the subordinate position of
women within the family and society in general. In addition, even
though the woman is only requesting assistance in stopping the
physical abuse, her society and her peers may view her as someone
who opposes the government and its laws, or holds political beliefs
contrary to the current system."' As a result of seeking help outside
the confines of the family, and of disobeying the male figure, the
right to dominate his wife or female companion).
83. Id.
84. See Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1063 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that political opinion is
expressed though words as well as action; therefore, an act defying the laws of the government
are a manifestation of political opinion). For a battered woman, this action could be
disobedience of her husband, refusal to perform her "wifely duties," or calling the police. See
Goldberg, supra note 82 (fleeing or seeking help regarded as opposition); see also supra notes 65-
68 and accompanying text (reviewing the reasons for the government attribution of political
opinion to a woman who challenges or does not conform to the social norm);Julie Mertus, State
Discriminatory Family Law and Customary Abuses, in WoMAN's RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS 135 (1995)
(discussing the states' use of separate sphere ideology to maintain the status quo, whereby
women are not protected from domestic violence and other inequalities in marriage). The
obligations of a woman in the family often define the more general obligations of women in
society. Id. at 135. State family laws affecting the social and economic status of women by
limiting their functions within society to reproduction and other family duties, thus supporting
the image of women that strengthens the state goal. Id. at 136. See also Marsha A. Freeman, The
Human Rights of Women in the Family: Issues and Recommendations for Implementation of the Women's
Convention, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS 149 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995)
(discussing specific articles within CEDAW and the implementation of their proposals). The
author argues that many states use preservation of family and culture to justify the denial of
human rights to women. Id. at 149. "[W]omen's roles, responsibilities, and recognized
capacities within the family are frequently limited by law and by culture and affect the exercise
of their capacities outside the family as well .... " Id. at 149-50.
85. If the persecutor punishes the woman who seeks government protection-either by not
protecting or by imposing a penalty for her transgressions-because the persecutor believes she
possesses political opinions whether or not she actually possesses those political opinions, then
the persecutor imputes a political opinion on the woman. See Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d
509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985) (stressing that "it is irrelevant whether a victim actually possesses any of
these opinions as long as the government believes that he does"); Gender Guidelines, supra
note 58, at 11 (accepting and discussing the application of imputed political opinion as a basis
for persecution because of political opinion); Refugee Handbook, supra note 81, para. 80
(stating that persecution based on political opinion may include situations in which "such
opinions have come to the notice of the authorities or are attributed by them to the
applicant"). If an applicant tries to show that her persecution is based on an imputed political
opinion she must demonstrate that the persecutor attributed a political opinion to her and that
the persecution feared is a reasonable possibility. See, eg., Aruta v. INS, 80 F.3d 1389, 1395 (9th
Cir. 1996); Huaman-Cornelio v. BIA, 979 F.2d 995, 1000 (4th Cir. 1992); Matter of R-, 20 I. &
N. Dec. 621 (BIA 1992); Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d 916,919 (9th Cir. 1991).
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woman faces reprisal from her husband, her family, her friends, and
even the government from which she seeks help because she is now
16
endangering the status quo.
2. Membership in a Particular Social Group
8 7
In Matter of Acosta,"s the BIA defined membership in a particular
social group as "persecution that is directed toward an individual who
is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common,
immutable characteristic."89 The Board stated that the shared
characteristics would be determined on a case by case basis and that
innate characteristics like sex, color, kinship ties, or shared past
experience can be included in this category.9' Some courts also take
86. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes (discussing the position of women and the
consequences of stepping out of the private realm).
87. The Refugee Handbook states that
A "particular social group" normally comprises persons of similar
backgrounds, habits or social status .... Membership of such a particular
social group may be at the root of persecution because there is no
confidence in the group's loyalty to the Govemment or because the
political outlook, antecedents, or economic activity of its members, or the
very existence of the social group as such, is held to be an obstacle to the
Government's policies.
Refugee Handbook, supra note 81, paras. 77-78. See generally Bower, supra note 72, at 199
(reviewing the different interpretations of a particular social group after the enactment of the
1980 Refugee Act and arguing that the Refugee Act adopted the international interpretation of
particular social groups found in the UNCHR Handbook (discussing memorandum from UN
High Commissioner for Refugees to Mr. I.Jackson, Division of Refugee law and Doctrine) (Dec.
29, 1988) (on file with author). The memorandum discusses the test the UNHCR advocates for
considering internal and external cohesion factors in determining whether there is an
identifiable social group. Id. The factors include: (1) a group consisting of a distinct entity
within the broader society, (2) a group definable by non-arbitrary characteristics that the
members share; (3) identified characteristic must be innate (a shared past experience, shared
values, attitudes, or behavior); (4) integrity of the group existing in the perception of the group
members or from the viewpoint of the society or segments of it; (5) characteristics existing
independent of the persecution, but playing a significant role in the persecution of the group
members; (6) demonstration of a risk of individual persecution; and (7) examination of the
historical, social, legal, and political realities relevant to identifying the group and the
persecution they are likely to suffer. Id.
88. 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
89. Id. at 233. The BIA used the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which states that general words
used in an enumeration with specific words should be defined in a way that is consistent with
the specific words. Id Since the other grounds of persecution enumerated in the INA and the
Protocol restrict refugees to those who are unable, or should, as a matter of conscience not be
required to change their status, the ground of particular social group should also be based on
immutable characteristics. Id.
90. See id.; Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998) (reviewing the different
approaches courts take when defining particular social group membership, and deciding to
follow the Acosta approach because it preserved the concept that the "term refugee is restricted
to those unable by their own action, or as a matter of conscience should not be required, to
avoid persecution."); Matter of Sanchez & Escobar, 19 I. & N. Dec. 276, 285 (BIA 1985)
(explaining that identifying common characteristics of a statistical grouping of the population
at risk is not enough to establish membership in a particular social group, and that petitioners
must show that the claimed persecution is on account of the group's identifying
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into account voluntary associations and external perceptions of
groups when determining an asylum claim based on membership in a
particular social group.91
To assist in the adjudication of asylum claims based on
membership in a particular social group, the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez-
Trujillo v. 17V 9 2 established a four-part test.93 According to the court,
to satisfy the four-part test, an applicant must: (1) identify a
cognizable social group; (2) prove that she is a member of the
group; (3) prove that the aim of the persecution is one of the group's
unifying characteristics; and (4) show that "special circumstances"
exist.94  Currently, there is no clear or internationally recognized
definition of a particular social group. Therefore, the likelihood of a
battered woman gaining refugee status and the right to a
discretionary grant of asylum will depend first on each court's
interpretation of particular social group, and second, on the court's
application of the Sanchez-Trujillo four part test.1
characteristics).
91. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9thCir. 1986) (finding that voluntary
associations impart a common characteristic fundamental to the identity of a member within
the discrete social group); Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982)
(stating that in special circumstances, individuals of similar backgrounds, habits, or social status
could fall under the category of a particular social group); see also Refugee Handbook, supra
note 81, para. 79 (allowing membership in a particular social group to substantiate a claim of
refugee status when special circumstances exist); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991)
(denying asylum to women previously beaten and raped by Salvadoran guerrillas because the
women did not possess a "recognizable and discrete" characteristic distinguishing them for
their persecutors from other young women). Using the Second Circuit's construction, asylum
seekers can claim asylum based on this category if from the viewpoint of the persecutor or the
outside world, individuals in the group possess a fundamental and distinguishing characteristic.
See Gore, 947 F.2d at 664.
92. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
93. Id. at 1574.
94. Id. at 1574-75.
95. Generally courts will consider gender as one characteristic in a combination with
others that will define a protected social group. See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991)
(finding that a woman who was raped and beaten in El Salvador did not demonstrate that
guerrillas were inclined to harm her based on her defined particular social group of women
previously battered and raped by Salvadoran guerrillas). The court concluded that "the
attributes of a particular social group must be recognizable and discrete. Possession of broadly-
based characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with
membership in a particular group." Id. at 664. This definition suggests a "gender plus"
requirement for the application of particular social group grounds for asylum; therefore, a
woman will be required to identify a particular social group that includes characteristics other
then gender. See Gender Guidelines, supra note 58, at 13; see also Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233,
1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that an Iranian woman fearing persecution because of her gender
would be a member of a particular social group under the INA, but the statute requires more
than the assertion of membership in a particular social group of women because one could not
reasonably conclude that all Iranian women had a well-founded fear of persecution based solely
on their gender, unless they were able to demonstrate that their inability and unwillingness to
conform leads to punishment); Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 639 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting as over
broad the particular social group of Iranian women who, due to their innate characteristic of
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Pursuant to these requirements, when seeking asylum as a battered
woman, the applicant must first define a cognizable social group."
Failure to define one will result in an adversejudgment.97 Withoutan
identified group, the adjudicator cannot complete his analysis of the
applicant's refugee status.9 Defining a particular social group is
difficult because domestic violence does not necessarily apply only to
specific types of women who share distinguishing and identifiable
characteristics." In addition, when identifying this social group,
women must distinguish the persecution they personally encounter
from the suffering of the general population.1'
One commentator states that a social group can include women
subjected to harsh or inhumane treatment when that treatment is the
result of a failure to voluntarily or involuntarily conform to cultural
or religious norms.' This category of women includes those who as a
result of uncontrollable circumstances or conscious choices cannot
conform and are not able to comply with cultural expectations,
religion, or society."'
Other factors to consider when identifying this social group
include a country's laws and customs based on gender."'
Discriminatory laws and practices depriving women of their
fundamental rights, or substantially affecting their right to earn a
living or obtain an education, constitute persecution" 4 Important
being women and the harsh restrictions placed on them because of this characteristic, were
persecuted).
96. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (explaining the requirements of the four part
test).
97. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577.
98. See id. (denying petitioner's claim for asylum because the particular social group the
petitioners identified encompassed individuals who have different lifestyles, varying interests,
diverse cultures, and contrary political ideals). The threshold question when adjudicating
asylum claims based on membership in a particular social group is whether or not the group
identified should be regarded as indicative of refugee status under the applicable immigration
statutes. Id at 1575. In addition, the category of particular social group was not intended to be
applied to an all-encompassing group; instead it was intended to apply to a cohesive,
homogenous group. Id at 1577.
99. See Sharif v. INS, 87 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that harsh conditions
suffered by everyone does not constitute persecution).
100. See David L. Neal, Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as Grounds for
Asylum, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 235 (1988) (arguing that women persecuted on
account of their sex should be able to use the framework available within the category of
particular social group).
101. Nancy Kelly, Guidelinesfor Women's Asylum Claim, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 813, 819
(1994) (analyzing the application of asylum law to gender based persecution; which was later
used in creating the INS Gender Guidelines).
102. Id
103. Id at 820.
104. Id.
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factors considered are: (1) the position of the woman before the law;
(2) her standing in court; (3) her right to file a complaint and
provide evidence; (4) her rights to divorce and custody; (5) her right
to own property; (6) her right to an education and a career; (7) her
status as a divorcee or single woman; (8) her right to control her
reproductive organs; (9) her right to travel, dress, and express
herself; (10) the incidence of reported violence as well as the
protection available; and (11) the sanctions or penalties imposed on
the violators.' 5
Finally, a woman can claim past or future persecution based on the
fact that a private actor abuses her and the government cannot or will
not provide protection from the abuse. 06  The combination of a
country's laws, customs, religious practices, and social norms create
an environment in which women's rights, health, and safety are not
protected.10' Therefore, women who are victims of domestic violence
can define their identifiable social group as battered women who
express their opposition to their constant subordinate position, and
who because of their gender, lack the benefits and assistance of
government agencies and of society in general. 8
Once a cognizable social group is identified, the woman must
establish her membership in the identified social group.'19 She has to
show that the persecuting government singled her out as a member
of the identified particular social group solely on the basis of the
identified distinguishing and immutable characteristics."0 Therefore,
a battered woman must show that private or public actors utilize the
law, economic institutions and governmental institutions to overcome
her right to live free from threats to her freedom and life."'
105. Id
106. IRat821.
107. See Part IVA2.a infra and accompanying notes (telling the story of one woman who
could not find help or protection in her home country).
108. See Kelly, supra note 101, at 818-21 (discussing the different social groups into which
women can fall); Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 968 (9th Cir. 1996) (declaring that women, as a
class, are eligible as persons who are persecuted due to their membership in the social group of
nonconforming and harshly treated women); see also infra Part IVA 2.a (discussing the stories of
two battered women who were not protected by their government).
109. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574-75 (9thCir. 1986). There are five statutory
factors that can qualify an alien as eligible for "prohibition of deportation or a discretionary
grant of asylum: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
asylum." Id. at 1574 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1253(h), 1101 (A) (42)(a)).
110. In Sanchez-Trujillo, the court held that the petitioners did not prove that the El
Salvadorian government singled them out for persecution on the basis of the petitioners' status
as young, working class, urban males, who did not serve or support the military or government.
See 801 F.2d at 1577. The evidence presented only established the fact that young males in
general are at risk of political violence due to the present conditions in El Salvador. Id.
111. Id.
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As the BIA states in Matter of Laipenieks,12 economic deprivation
and severe social and institutional disadvantages or deprivations do
constitute persecuton."3 Using the woman's own testimony,"4 as well
as reports on conditions within the persecuting country, an applicant
can show that she is a member of the identified group who suffers
from specific economic and social deprivations and disadvantages."'
Finally, the applicant must show that the government targets this
particular social group on account of the identified characteristics of
the group members.116  Evidence of incidents of actual persecution
can assist in establishing this fact."7  A review and analysis of the
impact of the laws within the country of origin that promote or
ignore domestic violence is also indicative of groups of people
targeted on the basis of an innate characteristic like sex."' As the BIA
stated in Matter ofAcosta, a refugee is "an individual in whose case the
bonds of trust, loyalty, protection, and assistance, existing between a
citizen and his country, have been broken and have been replaced by
112. 18 1. &N. Dec. 433,456-57 (BIA 1983).
113. Id.
114. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,421 (1987). The evidence presented to show
persecution must be "specific, objective facts supporting an inference of past persecution or risk
of future persecution. That the objective facts are established through the credible and
persuasive testimony of the applicant does not make those facts less objective." Id. See also
Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079, 1084 (1983) (stating that an applicant's assertion of possible fear
is insufficient).
115. Applicants often utilize UNHCR reports and U.S. State Department reports, as well as
other documents to illustrate the general conditions within a country. See In re Fauziya Kasinga,
I. & N. Dec. 3278 (BIA 1996), available in 1996 WL 379826 (accepting letters from applicant's
mother, a letter from an anthropologist, State Department Reports on conditions in Togo, and
memoranda from the Office of International Affairs of the INS to show the conditions in that
applicant's country of origin, and to provide the applicant's testimony with sufficient evidence
in order to establish her credibility); Matter of Sanchez & Escobar, 19 I. & N. Dec. 276, 279
(BIA 1985) (reviewing the evidence the petitioners presented in regards to conditions in El
Salvador; the evidence consisted of newspaper and magazine articles, the testimony of 13
wimesses, scholarly reports, news releases, letters and publications by individuals and
international organizations involved or interested in the conflict in El Salvador).
116. Sanchez-Trujillov. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574-75 (9thCir. 1986).
117. See id& at 1577 (concluding that the evidence the petitioners presented only indicated
that the risk of persecution related to the existence of actual or imputed political opinion,
which applied equally to all segments of the population in El Salvador, and agreeing with the
BIA decision that the evidence was inconclusive in establishing that age and gender when
combined with labor class, urban residence, or political neutrality had any relation to likelihood
of persecution); In re Fauziya Kasinga, I. & N. Dec. 3278 (BIA 1996), available in 1996 WL
379826 (determining that applicant was able to demonstrate actual persecution by showing that
she would be subjected to female genital mutilation (FGM) because she was a young woman
who was just married).
118. See Bower, supra note 72, at 91 (analyzing the human rights violations of women facing
domestic violence and concluding that when a government makes no laws prohibiting gender-
based violence or fails to vigorously enforce such laws, then the government condones the
violence, and the private person committing the abuse becomes an actor or an agent of the
government).
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the relation of an oppressor to a victim." 9 If a woman is not
protected and does not feel safe because her government refuses to
or is unable to control her husband's actions, then she is the target of
persecution. 21 She is the victim of an oppressive husband who is
supported by an equally oppressive government.12' When each
requirement of the four-part test is satisfied, the battered woman is
finally considered a refugee and is eligible for asylum."
B. Effects of Recent Decisions on the Definition of Membership in a
Particular Social Group
In 1996, the BIA decision in In re Fauziya Kasinga2" provided a new
twist to the definition of membership in a particular social group.24
While portions of this decision are beneficial to battered women
seeking asylum, the decision and the narrow social group definition is
riddled with new obstacles."5
One result of this decision is that an applicant no longer needs to
establish the alleged persecutor's subjective intent to punish the
members of the identified particular social group."16  The BIA
designated this opinion as precedent, 27 and the Ninth Circuit
decision in Pitcherskaia v. 1NVS12s later followed the principles set forth
in Kasinga."9
119. 19 I. & N. Dec. at 235. See also Refugee Act, supra note 7 and accompanying text;
Refugee Convention, supra note 8 and accompanying text; Protocol, supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
120. See infra Part IV (applying asylum procedures and tests to battered women).
121. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes (discussing the oppressive nature of the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the resulting persecution domestic violence victims must endure).
122. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1575 (9th Cir. 1986) (analyzing the four-part
test).
123. I. & N. Dec. 3278 (BIA 1996), available in 1996 WL 379826 (reversing the decision of
the immigration judge and granting asylum based on membership in a narrowly defined,
particular social group).
124. After the death of her father Fauziya Kasinga was no longer protected from
undergoing the traditional practice of female genital mutilation. IM at *8. Fauziya ran away
from her husband and native land of Togo due to her fear of undergoing FGM. Id. FGM, as
the applicant's tribe practices, involves "cutting the genitalia with knives, extensive bleeding,
and a 40 day recovery period." Id. at *4. The BIA granted asylum based on her membership in
the particular social group of "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not
had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice." Id.
125. See infra notes 126-47 and accompanying text.
126. In reFauziya Kasinga, 1996 WL 379826, at *8.
127. Id.
128. 118 F.3d 641, 646 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing the applicability of the decision in In re
Fauziya Kasinga).
129. See id at 643 (granting asylum to a woman who feared persecution on account of her
membership in the particular social group of Russian lesbians and her political opinions in
support of the rights of homosexuals in Russia). The court concluded that the definition of
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Specifically, the court in Pitcherskaia, concluded that persecution is
defined objectively and its analysis does not depend on the subjective
intent of the persecutor, but on "what a reasonable person would
deem 'offensive. ' 'Is" As a result of these decisions, the intent or
motive of a persecutor is relevant only when an alien is establishing
that the persecution is inflected on her "on account of' actual or
perceived characteristics the alien holds.1' Therefore, a battered
woman's claim does not need to prove that the inactions of her
government or the actions of her husband were intended to harm
her.12 She will only need to show that from an objective standpoint,
the government and her husband inflicted harm and suffering on
her because she is a woman who does not conform to the social or
religious norms of her society133
In addition, the Kasinga decision did not accept cultural tradition
as ajustification or legitimization of the subjugation of women in the
applicant's tribe." The Board's analysis recognized that too often,
violence against women occurs so frequently that society eventually
views it as different from traditionally recognized forms of human
rights violations.13 Therefore, the court concluded that the
argument and inference that female genital mutilation ("FGM") is
used to control and oppress women's sexuality in order to ensure the
dominance of men and the exploitation of women is valid.16  The
persecution is objective, and that an applicant should not be required to prove an intent to
harm or punish as an element of the persecution. Id. at 646. The majority opinion went on to
say that "[n]either the Supreme Court nor this court has construed the Act as imposing a
requirement that the alien prove that her persecutor was motivated by a desire to punish or
inflict harm." Id. at 646.
130. Id. at 647. ButseeSharifv. INS, 87 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying asylum to an
Iranian woman and concluding that "harsh conditions shared by an entire population do not
amount to persecution").
131. Id. SeealsoBahramniav. INS, 782 F.2d 1243, 1248 (5th Cir. 1986) (reiterating the need
for evidence establishing a nexus between membership in a particular social group and
persecution or the reasonable forseeability of future persecution).
132. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (discussing the court's interpretation of a
particular social group).
133. See Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 646-47.
134. See In re Fauziya Kasinga, 1996 WL 379826, at *8 (concluding that FGM could be
considered persecution "without passing... the INS's proposed 'shocks the conscience' test").
The court accepted reports indicating the lack of legal recourse, threats to freedom, acts of
physical violence, and the social ostracization a woman will face for refusing to undergo the
traditional practice of FGM. Id. at *5.
135. The violence is so prevalent that it is accepted and viewed as natural and part of the
status quo, and it becomes an everyday accepted, and sometimes, promoted action even when
the violence is comparable to the means of torture used against men. See Bower, supra note 72,
at 182 (discussing membership in a particular social group as a basis for asylum for women who
are the victims of violence).
136. In reFauziya Kasinga, 1996 WL 379826, at *9.
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court refused to accept arguments of social norms, culture, and
tradition as reasons for ignoring and accepting the violence inflicted
137
on women.
The same conclusions are drawn when one analyzes laws restricting
a woman's ability to work, to obtain a divorce, to retain custody of her
children, and to seek protection from her abusive husband138
Therefore, a woman's claim of persecution resulting from laws deeply
rooted in culture and religion cannot validly be dismissed on the
basis of cultural and social norms that a government refuses to
modify.
1 9
Unfortunately, the Kasinga decision also contains some harmful
conclusions. The detrimental effects of the Kasinga decision are
found within the court's construction of the particular social group.140
According to the board, only women in the Tchamb-Kunsuntu Tribe
of northern Togo, who oppose the practice of FGM, fall within the
narrowly defined particular social group.41 Thus, a woman must
show evidence of public acts or speech in opposition to a law or
custom to demonstrate that the government is aware of her
opposition. This requirement is detrimental to a battered woman's
claim of asylum. Due to the nature of the abusive relationship from
which she recently escaped, and due to the cultural norms and laws
137. See id. (determining that the plaintiff had met her burden of establishing the
reasonableness and likelihood that the mutilation she faces is on account of her status as a
tribal young woman, that she opposes the practice of mutilation, and that it will be inflicted in
conformance with tribal customs or norms because of her status).
138. See Sullivan, supra note 72, at 128 (stating that the "law constructs and sustains power
relations within private life through both active regulation of private life... and by the failure
to regulate other conduct in private life."); Mertus, supra note 85, at 135 (arguing that states
intrude on family life only when the intervention serves the states' larger political and social
goals). The author also criticizes the ability of men to make all important decisions for women
as a result of a state's laws. Id. at 137. Additionally, the failure of laws within a state to regulate
the actions of husbands who physically abuse their wives and children sustains the power
relations and hierarchical structure within the family. See Seith, supra note 3 and accompanying
text (analyzing the effects that economic and political institutions have. on abusive
relationships).
139. See generally Neal, supra note 100, at 235 (deciding that women should fall under the
category of "particular social group" because they are a cognizable class). Specifically, the
author concludes that laws, regulations, government actions or inactions that intentionally
target women for harsh and inhumane treatment based solely on their gender are not
justifiable. Id.
140. In reFauziya Kasinga, 1996 WL 379826, at *2.
141. See id. ("Young women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern
Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe, and
who oppose the practice, are recognized as members of a "particular social group" within the
definition of the term 'refugee' under section 101(a) (42) (A) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act...").
142. Cf Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240-41 (3d Cir. 1993) (denying applicant asylum
because she did not present evidence of her intentions of opposing Iranian social codes to the
point of being punished by the government).
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that keep her in a subordinate position, the battered woman will
rarely take action that will further endanger her life."'
In 1997, the Third Circuit criticized the justification of generally
applicable laws that persecute certain groups of people.' The court
refused to deny asylum on the basis of a generally applicable law
because the law in question was only disguised as a generally
applicable law.145 Such an analysis allows battered women to present
evidence of laws that place them in a subordinate position based on
their gender, and that are lacking in appropriate legal remedies.'46
Such evidence specifically demonstrates persecution that is aimed at
her due to her membership in a particular social group, regardless of
the fact that her actions violated laws that are generally applicable to
all persons in that country.1
4 7
In spite of these recent developments, and in spite of the recently
published INS Gender Guidelines, in the summer of 1999, the BIA
overturned an Immigration Judge's decision granting a Guatemalan
woman asylum based on her claim of persecution on the basis of the
abuse her husband inflicted on her. 48  This decision severely and
negatively impacts the application of U.S. asylum laws to the claims of
all battered women. In its opinion in In re R-A-, the Board concluded
that the applicant, a battered woman, did not satisfy the requirements
delineated in U.S. asylum and refugee laws, and was therefore, not
eligible for asylum.14 9 The Board stated that in the instant case, the
143. See infra Part lV and accompanying notes (discussing the social environment and status
of Iranian women).
144. See Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1061 (3d Cir. 1997) (declaring that no exceptions
should be made for generally applied laws if they are based on one of the five factors and if the
punishment under these laws is so extreme that it constitutes persecution).
145. See id at 1061 (deciding that courts should provide protection without "distinguishing
between persecution disguised as 'under the law' and persecution not so disguised."); Refugee
Handbook, supra note 81, paras. 56 & 59 (stating that even though persecution is not
considered the same as "punishment of a common law offense," prosecution under some laws
can equate to persecution when it does not conform to accepted human rights standards). See
also Sharifv. INS, 87 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying petitioner's application for asylum
even though she claimed fear of persecution due to Iranian laws that limit the rights and
freedom of women, and impose harsh punishments for their disobedience). In spite of the
gender-based laws that maintained and perpetuated the subordination of women in Iran, the
court stated that "punishment which results from violating a country's laws of general
applicability, absent some showing that the punishment is being administered for a nefarious
purpose," does not amount to persecution. Id. at 934-35.
146. See infra Part IV.B.1 and accompanying notes (analyzing an Immigration Judge's
decision to grant asylum to a battered woman based on the laws and customs of her country and
her husband's status).
147. See infra Part IV.B.1 and accompanying notes (applying this standard and discussing the
Gender Guidelines).
148. In reR-A-, I & N. Dec. 3402 (BIA 1999), available in 1999 WL 424364.
149. See id at *2 (illustrating the many factors that are considered in determining whether a
particular group should be recognized as a basis for asylum). These factors include how the
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victim of domestic violence "failed to introduce meaningful evidence
that her husband's behavior was influenced by his perception of her
opinion.. ." and that "the existence of shared descriptive
characteristics are not necessarily sufficient to qualify those
possessing the common characteristics as members of a 'particular
social group."..0 This finding contradicts the BIA precedent decision
in Matter of Kasinga as well as Matter of Acosta's immutability standards
discussed above.'51 As the minority opinion indicates, the victim in In
re R-A- was opposed to and "resisted a practice ingrained in the
culture, broadly sanctioned by the community, and unprotected by
the state."5 2 The societal objective of the cultural norm denying the
victim protection was the assurance and promulgation of male
dominance.5 3 Allowing this decision to control future asylum claims
of battered women will only assist abusers and complacent
governments to continue the oppression and degradation of women.
When applying U.S. asylum laws to such cases, future adjudicators
must continue to utilize the INS Gender Guidelines and precedents
set in Matter of Kasinga, Pitcherskaia, and Matter of Acosta to provide
international protection for women whose own country is not willing
to provide them with protection.
IV. BATTERED WOMEN ESCAPING THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
A religious code of conduct covering all aspects of a Muslim's life,
the shar'ia, governs society in the Islamic Republic of Iran.'54 Iran
maintains its status as a theocracy and attempts to conform its laws,
and the actions of its people, to the teachings of the Qu'ran and the
following parties perceive the group: (1) the potential persecutor; (2) the asylum applicant; and
(3) other members of the society. Id.
150. Id.at*l.
151. In the last few years, the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits have also adopted Matter of
Acosta's immutability standard. See Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1998) (adopting
the Acosta standard and accepting the social group of "parents of Burmese student dissidents");
Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239-41 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that Iranian women who refuse
to conform to the government's gender-specific laws and social norms could satisfy the Acosta
standard); Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 627 (1st Cir. 1998) (accepting that those
associated with the former Ghanaian government could comprise a social group due to fears
arising from characteristics they could not change).
152. In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *24. The minority opinion concluded that the
respondent did present evidence of "a prolonged and persistent pattern of abuse designed to
dominate the respondent and to overcome any effort on her part to assert her independence or
to resist his abuse." Id. at *21.
153. Id.
154. See KErrH HODKINSON, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW: A SOURCEBOOK 1 (1984) (discussing the
validity of marriage, the rights and obligations of husband and wife, and the dissolution of an
Islamic marriage). This divine law provides little distinction between moral, ethical, and legal
conduct. Id.
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codes of the shar'ia.'5 ' Iran also attempts to bestow some rights on
women. 56 This is in part a result of Iran's former secular regime that
brought women to an almost equal footing with men.5 7  More
importantly, the former regime enacted family law legislation,
granting women more influence over divorce and custody issues."'
However, in the last twenty years, the new regime repealed most laws
that aided the advancement of women.' The reforms began with
the insertion of vague Islamic criteria in the constitution to provide
justifications for infringing on the rights of all the people.'60 In 1979,
through the Islamization process and the new national agenda of
155. Id.
156. According to Article 20 of the Iranian Constitution, "[a]ll citizens of the country, both
men and women, equally enjoy the protection of the law and enjoy all human, political,
economic, social, and cultural rights, in conformity with Islamic criteria." Constitution, supra note 5,
at 25 (emphasis added). See also Robin Wright, Islam Rising Ideolog Muslims Open up to Modern
World, LA. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1993, at 2 (reporting on the divorce of one woman who was promised
housework compensation by the judges under the new family divorce laws, and claiming that
the new laws recognize women as adults). Of course it is important to remember that the
government's goal of protecting and promoting social and religious conformity temper any
attempts at reaching "equality." See S.I. Strong, Law and Religion in Israel and Iran: How the
Integration of Secular and Spiritual Laws Affect Human Rights and the Potential for Violenc 19 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 109, 163 (1997) (discussing the importance and value of maintaining community
norms through the regulation of family life, and creation of laws and regulations that facilitate
and safeguard the sanctity and stability of the Islamic family). Often, this goal is achieved
through discriminatory practices that curtail the rights and freedom of women. See generally
ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGmS 175 (1999) (discussing Islamic human rights
provisions and the priority placed on traditional hierarchies, and claiming that the Constitution
uses an "evasive formula to deal with the principle of equality" by not mentioning sex or
religion in Article 19, which discusses the equal rights of the people); Constitution, supra note 5,
at 25, Ch. M (defining the rights of the people). Article 19 states that "[a]ll people of Iran,
whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; and colour, race,
language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege." But see ZIBA MIR-HOSSEINI, MARRIAGE ON
TRIAL A STUDY OF ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 73 (1993) (discussing the negligible limits the ICC places
on a man's unilateral right to divorce); infra note 159 and accompanying text (reviewing the
Iranian Family Protection Act, which is found in the new ICC).
157. See MAYER, supra note 156, at 114 (discussing the Iranian Family Protection Act of 1967
as amended in 1975). This progressive reform required divorce before the court, regardless of
who requested the divorce, and broadened grounds on which women could seek divorce, and
based custody of children on a "best interest" standard. Id.
158. See generally MAYER, supra note 156, at 114 (discussing The Family Protection Act).
159. See MAYER, supra note 156, at 114 (indicating that The Family Protection Act was
nullified in February of 1979, as the Ayatollah Khomeini began the movement towards the
Islamization of Iran); see also Akraln Mir-Hosseini, After the Revolution: Violations of Women's
Human Rights in Iran, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS 72 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper
eds., 1995) (reviewing the repealment of the Family Protection Act and the status of women in
various documents of the post-revolutionary regime); Strong, supra note 156, at 164 (reviewing
the rights and protections taken away after the new government came into power, and the
resulting marginalization and oppression of women); Azadeh Kian, Gendered Occupation and
Women's Status in Post-Revolutionary Iran, 31 MIDDLE E. STUDIES No. 3 (1995) (stating that in spite
of new family laws curtailing divorce rights of men, including twelve clauses in all marriage
contracts, the positive aspects of the law do not create legal guarantees because the government
is not always willing to enforce the new provisions).
160. MAYER, supra note 156, at 30.
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protecting the family, the new regime took away the power and
control the Iranian woman had gained two decades earlier. 1
The new codes leave women with limited options. If an Iranian
woman finds herself in an abusive marriage, she is forced to either
stay in the abusive marriage or request a divorce. 62 If the woman
chooses the latter, she risks losing her honor, reputation, status, and
most importantly, her children. The shift to Islamization in Iran
allows the government to use divine authority as a legitimization tool
for rules and systems that exploit and oppress married and single
women"' through unequal and discriminatory treatment. 164 This shift
has resulted in an increase in human rights violations, specifically
against battered women." To understand the impact these laws and
customs have on the rights and freedom of women, it is important to
understand first, the concept of marriage, second, the position of
each spouse within the marriage, and third, the laws governing the
dissolution of marriage in Iran.
A. The Effects of a Theocracy on the Treatment and Rights of Women
1. Islamic Law and Family
The official Islamic ideology in Iran is "to override any conflicting
human rights for women" and prioritize their roles within the family
as wives and mothers. 6  In Shi'i Islam 67 the obligations and rights of
161. See generally Kian, supra note 159 (discussing the implementation of the shar'ia in Iran
and the institutionalization of gender inequality). The author states that once the shar'ia
became the principle source of law, a series of regressions ensued affecting women's rights in
the private and public realm. Id. See also AlexandraJ. Zolan, The Effect of islamization on the Legal
and Social Status of Women in Iran, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 183 (1987) (arguing that under the
new government, the official goal is to follow Islamic principles, resulting in the prohibition of
activities and practices accepted by the Phalavi regime, and the change in the status of married
women).
162. See Michael Dowd, Battered Women: A Perspective on Injustice; 1 CARDOZo WOMEN'S L.J. 1,
19-31 (1993) (discussing the various reasons battered women do not leave their abusive
husbands).
163. The discussion herein is limited to married women.
164. See MAYER, supra note 156, at 29 (discussing the opportunistic aspects of Islamization).
In addition, the vagueness of Islamic criteria that limits women's rights throughout Iranian
society grants governments great leeway in choosing what kinds of discriminatory measures to
impose. Id. at 124. One ideologue of the Islamic Republic, the Ayatollah Mutahari, states that
"[t]he specific task of women in this society is to marry and bear children. They will be
discouraged from entering legislative, judicial, or whatever careers may require decision
making, as women lack intellectual ability and discerning judgment required for these
concerns." MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 73 (quoting the Ayatollah) (citations omitted).
165. MAYER, supra note 156, at 28.
166. MAYER, supra note 156, at 85.
167. This is a minority sect in Islam, most Muslims follow the Sunni school of thought. See
generally DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 3-19 (1998) (discussing the
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each spouse are based on a conglomeration of legal, biological, and
divine determinism that places the married woman in a subordinate
position."' The state condones violent and discriminatory acts*
against her in the name of protecting the family.'6 9 The assumptions
made in each of these areas arise from several documents including
the Qu'ran, the shar'ia, and the Iranian Constitution.7 Today, the
Iranian Civil Code ("ICC") governs marriage while the Special Civil
Court adjudicates its regulations.1
7
'
a. Marriage
From a legal standpoint, the marriage contract marks the
beginning of the subordination of a woman within her family.17 The
marriage contract is a legal, religious, economic, and symbolic
transaction, during which the groom exchanges a dowry for the
ownership and right of the bride's sexual and reproductive organs.Y
Upon the completion of the contract, the husband is responsible for
the control, authority, and protection of the woman. 4  The
underlying assumptions of the contract are that of ownership and
purchase.' 75 As a purchaser, the man is the one "in charge" of the
woman because he has paid for her.176 Therefore, the husband has
the authority and right to control his wife's activities. 177 In turn, she
must submit and be obedient to her husband.
78
Biological determinism further entrenches the woman's status in
historical development of Islam).
168. See SHAHLA HAEMJ, Divorce in Contemporary Iran: A Male Prerogative in Self Wil4 in ISLAMIC
FAMILY LAW 55, 56 (Chibli Mallat & Jane Connors eds., 1993) (comparing and analyzing the
institution of marriage in Iran and Morocco).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. The ICC codified the standards set by the shar'ia. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 25.
The September 1979 Special Civil Courts Act created the new religious courts, which are
presided over by Islamic Judges and empowered to deal with family disputes. Id. These new
courts replaced the family courts of the former secular government and maintained the
requirement of allowing a divorce only with a wife's consent or, in its absence, the court's
permission. Id. at 53.
172. MIR-HoSSEINI, supra note 156, at 57.
173. See MiR-HossEIN1, supra note 156, at 57-58 (discussing the similarities between the
marriage contract and a contract of sale in which there is a "transfer of absolute property").
174. See MIR-HosSEINI, supra note 156, at 33 (reviewing the rights and obligations the
marriage contract bestows on husband and wife).
175. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 57.
176. See MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 58; see also Qu'ran 4:34 (discussing the man's right
to control what he has paid for).
177. See HAERI, supra note 168, at 58 (analyzing symbolic interaction of an Islamic marriage
contract and its implications on the status of the wife within the new marriage).
178. HAERI, supra note 168, at 58.
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the marital relationship. 9 The concept of nature creates a unique
assumption of the nature, function, and status of men and women, as
well as their rights and obligations to each other.180 The Shi'i law
allows and condones polygamy, concubinage, and unilateral divorce
to accommodate male sexuality.181 The Constitution, however,
relegates women to the position of maintaining the household and
obeying their husbands.82 In an attempt to return women to a
domestic role, the Constitution's preamble places an emphasis on
family and the woman's role in raising children and maintaining the
family.8 3 This legally and divinely prescribed role combined with the
marriage contract creates an obligation of obedience that is culturally
acceptable as a social norm.'84 When that norm is challenged, the
country's legal institutions work to replace and maintain the power
and control of the husband within the family18s
Finally, a woman's second class status is further justified through
arguments of divine decree.' 6 These arguments declare that the only
way to achieve social order is through submission and obedience.'87
When a woman is disobedient to her husband, she is considered
rebellious and must be punished because her disobedience causes
179. HAERI, supra note 168, at 58.
180. See HAERI, supra note 168, at 59 (discussing the effects of biological determinism on the
concept of marriage). Individuals governing the state use psychological differences to justify
the existing sexual inequalities. See id.
181. See HAERI, supra note 168, at 60 (indicating that the ICC somewhat curtails a man's
right to a unilateral divorce); see MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156 and accompanying text
(discussing the legal codes and judicial procedures in Iranian family courts).
182. The preamble to the Constitution states that the family is the fundamental unit of
society and women are an imperative and central figure in its protection. Constitution, supra
note 5, at 11. According to the preamble, women now recover their "momentous and precious
function of motherhood... [and at the same time] assume a pioneering social role .... "
Constitution, supra note 5, at 11-12.
183. Article 10 of the Iranian Constitution states that "[s]ince the family is the fundamental
unit of Islamic Society, all laws, regulations, and pertinent programs must tend to facilitate the
formation of a family, and to safeguard its sanctity and the stability of family relations on the
basis of the law and ethics of Islam." Constitution, supra note 5, at 21; see also MAYER, supra note
156, at 114 (emphasizing that the family is a tool used to create programs to keep women in
domestic roles and dependent on the husband).
184. HAERI, supra note 168, at 61.
185. See HAERI, supra note 168, at 61 (discussing the implications of a bride price and the
connection of a woman's obedience to the payment of the bride price and future maintenance
of the wife).
186. HAERI, supra note 168, at 62.
187. HAERI, supra note 168, at 62. According to the author "Islam means submission and
obedience." Id. Therefore, social order is maintained if man is obedient to God, people are
obedient to the supreme leader, women are obedient to their father or husband, and children
are obedient to their fathers. I& at 63. In addition, any disobedience within this chain leads to
a world of chaos. Id
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disorder and chaos in society as a whole.lss Therefore, to avoid social
chaos the Qu'ran condones and expects the husband to ensure
obedience through physical means. 9 As a result, in an Islamic state
where the underlying assumptions of the laws are derived from the
Qu'ran, the government can use religious edicts to justify the social
and cultural norms that place women in a subordinate position.'9
Two key assumptions affecting the treatment of women are found in
Islamic teachings: (1) the submission and obedience of all people;
and (2) a man's right to do what is necessary to take possession of the
object of a sale, in this case, the wife. 9 ' The result is a set of religious
and legal doctrines that legitimize beatings and physical violence to
ensure the obedience of the woman and maintain her subordinate
position in the domestic sphere.92
b. Divorce
Throughout the marriage, a woman remains economically
dependent on her husband, thus creating an insurmountable
obstacle when she is emotionally ready and able to leave the
marriage.93  The combination of legal, biological, and divine
determinism provides men with an economic function on which
women are forced to rely.1 14 The husband's authority over the woman
188. See HAEs, supra note 168, at 62; see also MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156 (discussing
reciprocal obligations as well as those owed by one spouse to the other).
189. See Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and
Equality Rights of Women:An Analysis Under the United Nations Charter, 35 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L.
271, 377 n.169 (quoting ABUL A 'LA MAUDUDID, THE MEANING OF THE QU'RAN 321 (1971)).
Maududi interprets the Qu'ran to grant men this authority with the verse "[a]s for those women
whose defiance you have cause to fear, admonish them and keep them apart from your beds
and beat them." Id. See also PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 167, at 182-84 (discussing actions that
are considered disobedient that will result in a husband's right to withhold food, clothing, and
housing until the wife obeys). Some of these disobedient acts include: "a woman who acts
superior to-their husband, disobeys his orders, leaves her marital home... without permission,
works outside the home without permission.... [or] borrows money without the permission of
ajudge or her husband." Id.
190. See Howland, supra note 189, at 307 (stating that a central theme in Muslim
fundamentalism is that "women harbor the seeds of destruction of all society and that to avoid
this they and their sexuality must be carefully controlled").
191. See Howland, supra note 189, at 308-09 (stating that obedience requires submission to
the husband in all matters, including those relating to sexual and social matters).
192. See Howland, supra note 189, at 309 ("If a wife is disobedient, a proper husband is first
to 'appeal to her good sense, and if she does not improve, then he may abandon her in her
marital bed. Thereafter, it is permissible for him to give her a good, but gentle, beating.'").
193. See Howland, supra note 189, at 310 (indicating that fundamentalists look unfavorably
upon any economic independence for a woman because it would free her of her father's and
husband's authority).
194. See Kian, supra note 159, at *5 (claiming that although the civil code grants women the
right to control their property, they are still considered financially dependent on their
husband).
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in both public and private legitimizes his role as the breadwinner and
decision-maker.19 5 The privileges that the shar'ia grants to men, and
the Iranian government enforces, furtherjustify this function. 196
In addition to economic dependence, the country's divorce laws
and judicial system also strengthen the husband's control over his
wife's life, freedom, and daily activities. The Iranian divorce laws and
judicial system do not provide the woman with any economic support
when she is the petitioner in a divorce proceeding.197 According to
the Qu'ran, the husband has the unilateral right to divorce his wife at
any time and without cause.9 8 This leaves the wife at the mercy of her
husband, who can use threats of divorce as a form of coercion when
the wife is "disobedient."1 While the ICC places a condition on this
divine right, the husband ultimately maintains his right to revoke the
marriage contract at any time.9
Under the ICC, both the husband and wife have the right to
petition for a divorce; however, for the wife, the process is more
complicated and the burden much higher.2 °1 As delineated in the
shar'ia, the ICC accepts four types of divorce: (1) talaq, which occurs
when the husband repudiates the wife; (2) khul and mubarat, which
the wife initiates and the husband accepts or the court orders;
(3) tatliq, which is divorce by court decree; and (4) faskh, which is the
annulment of the marriage.2
It is the third type of divorce, tatliq, that plays a significant role in a
battered woman's ability to gain protection from the country's legal
institutions.9 When a husband does not consent to his wife's request
195. Kian, supra note 159, at *5.
196. Kian, supra note 159, at *5.
197. SeeMIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing the consequences
of a woman initiating divorce).
198. See HAERm, supra note 168, at 63 (stating that since marriage is a contract, the husband
can return "the goods" at any time).
199. See infra Part IV.A.2 and accompanying footnotes (relating the story of women seeking
divorce in Iran).
200. In Iran, the husband must register the divorce in the family court, but he still does not
need grounds for the divorce. See generally MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 30-36 (discussing
the code's requirement for both men and women to obtain the court's permission when
requesting a divorce). Article 1133 of the ICC grants the man the right to repudiate his wife
with no grounds, and Article 1142 requires that the repudiation follow a set procedure. See id.
at 36.
201. See infra Part IV.A.2 and accompanying notes (discussing the procedures involved in
obtaining a divorce).
202. For a more in depth discussion of each divorce see MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 36-
53.
203. HAERI, supra note 168, at 67.
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for a divorce, she can acquire a tatliq through a court order. 4
However, before the court considers her request, she must prove the
grounds for the request.
205
The post-revolutionary Iranian marriage contract establishes
several grounds for a wife-initiated divorce.0 One of the grounds
includes a husband's maltreatment of his wife to the extent that the
marriage is intolerable. 7 Article 1130 of the ICC authorizes the
courts to grant a wife-initiated divorce as long as she is able to prove
that the continuation of the marriage will result in hardship or
harm.0 Unfortunately, the grounds for divorce are inserted into the
marriage contract as conditions and are only valid if both husband
and wife sign the conditions.2°
The judicial process involved in a tatliq divorce also serves as an
obstacle to a battered woman attempting to leave the abusive
environment of her marriage. Such a petition is filed in one of only
sixteen Special Civil Courts in Iran. 0 In addition to the minimal
number of courts available and accessible throughout the country, a
woman escaping the violence in her home must also find a way to
generate the money needed for the filing fee. 21' Generating the filing
fee, however, is difficult for many women who are not allowed to
204. See HAERI, supra note 168, at 67 (discussing the barriers women face when they cannot
provide sufficient responses to the threshold question involving the grounds for requesting the
divorce).
205. While a husband can simply accuse a woman of disobedience and obtain a judicially
decreed divorce without any proof, a woman must prove some type of ill treatment before she is
able to get the court's attention. See HAER, supra note 168, at 67. The author discusses a case
reported in an Iranian woman's magazine, Zan-i-Ruz. See id. The case involved a young wife
whose husband abused her and was told that she must provide evidence of the abuse before the
court would issue a warning to the husband. Id. The wife first had to convince the judge that
her husband was harming her before she could proceed to file for divorce. Id. In the
meantime, her husband refused to consent to a divorce and filed a petition claiming
disobedience on her part and refused to provide her with maintenance. Id.
206. For a comprehensive list of these grounds included in the marriage contract as
conditions see MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 57.
207. MiR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 57.
208. See THE CIVIL CODE OF IRAN 170 (M.A.R. Taleghany trans., 1995) [hereinafter ICC];
MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 65. Seven out of the sixteen courts are located in the capital
city of Tehran. Id. This creates an accessibility obstacle for women who do not live in the city
or near one of the other courts. Id. This lack of accessibility is another example of the
inadequate protection of women's life, freedom, and physical dignity. Id.
209. See HAERI, supra note 168, at 67 (finding that men and women do not negotiate a
marriage contract from a position of social, psychological, economic, or social equality). As a
result, women often do not insist on the signature of the husband and validation of the
conditions fearing that he will seek another wife rather than consent to the limitations of his
rights and power. See id. It is reported that in a one-month period, up to 100 engagements are
broken off because of disputes over these conditions. See id. (quoting an article in the IRAN
TIMES, June 3, 1986, at 1).
210. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 25.
211. MiR-HOSSENI, supra note 156, at 25.
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work or control household finances.212
If the woman is able to reach one of the courts, and if she is
somehow able to obtain the necessary money, either through her
friends or family, the case will appear in court anywhere from a few
days to a few months after the application is filed.213 The proceedings
are conducted informally in the judge's chambers with no attorneys
present.2" The husband and wife file separate applications. 215 The
wife will most likely file a petition claiming lack of maintenance, and
the husband will respond or initiate a petition claiming
disobedience.1 6
The husband's application, whether an initiation of divorce or a
response to the wife's request, has two purposes. First, it is intended
to ensure that the court will order the dowry returned to the
husband.1 7 Second, if the divorce is granted, the claim ensures that
the court will not require the husband to provide the wife with
maintenance or pay her any portion of the income he acquired
during the marriage.1
Once the applications are filed, a court clerk meets with both
parties and attempts to reconcile the couple.2 5 This meeting occurs
outside the courtroom, with the parties ordered to discuss the matter
in the presence of the clerk.20 If an agreement is not reached, the
couple then goes before the judge.21 This time, the judge attempts
to reconcile the couple.222 If the judge fails, he assigns an arbitrator
who again attempts to reconcile the couple.23  At the end of this
session, the arbitrator submits a report assessing the nature of the
212. See generally MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 25 (acknowledging that obtaining the
money, transportation, and time necessary to go to court is extremely difficult when friends and
family may be unwilling to help in the dissolution of a family).
213. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 25.
214. Mi-HossErNi, supra note 156, at 25.
215. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 25.
216. See MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 35 (stating that the marriage contract creates an
obligation of maintenance for the husband as long as the wife upholds her duties and
obligations of obedience).
217. HAERI, supra note 168, at 66.
218. See HAERi, supra note 168, at 66 (indicating that at the time of the divorce, a woman has
the right to keep her dowry and to receive up to one-half of the husband's income, provided
that she is not the one requesting the divorce, and the court decides that the husband's request
is not a result of the wife's ill-temper or behavior).
219. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 60-61.
220. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 60-61.
221. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 60-61.
222. MIR-HOSSEINi, supra note 156, at 60-61.
223. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 60-61.
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dispute and the possibility of reconciliation.224 Thejudge can then set
a date for a hearing or start another cycle of reconciliation efforts. 5
The judicial process is detrimental to the safety and welfare of a
battered woman who has reached an intolerable point in her home.
Battered women who seek a divorce in a country like Iran believe that
in order to survive, they do not have any other options.2 11 It is
difficult to imagine that married women in Iran are willing to fight
for a divorce simply on account of inconvenience. These women live
in a country where their society and government take intentional
steps, through custom and the implementation of their laws and
procedures, to discourage the separation of families, reinforcing the
privacy of marital and familial relationships.2 In spite of the stigma
of divorce and the risk of losing their only source of income, their
only home, and their children, these women turn to the Special Civil
Courts in Iran-their only resource."
c. Custody
The judicial process is not the only obstacle affecting a battered
woman's accessibility to divorce. In Iran, divorce often equals the loss
221 211of a child,2  which further explains the low incidence of divorce.
Custody laws, therefore, keep many women in the marriage and in
danger because they are not able or willing to give up their
children.2 1
The ICC places the child's guardianship in the hands of the father
and paternal grandfather. 2 2 According to the ICC, the mother has
224. MIR-HossEsNi, supra note 156, at 60-61.
225. MiR-HossEINI, supra note 156, at 60-61. Article 1130 of the ICC gives the judge the
discretionary power to withhold or issue a divorce requested by a woman. See id. at 67.
226. SeeMIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 29 (indicating that there is a social stigma attached
to taking private marital conflicts into the public arena of the court). When a woman resorts to
requesting assistance from the courts, it is most likely after all other attempts to resolve conflicts
within the marriage are exhausted. See id.
227. In fact, since the abuse often entails a lack of maintenance in conjunction with the
husband's refusal to allow his wife to work outside of the home, a majority of female petitioners
come from the popular classes where material need outweighs honor. See MIR-HOSSEINI, supra
note 156, at 29; see also infra Part 1V.A.2.a and accompanying notes (reviewing the effects of
divorce on custody rights).
228. See supra Part IVA1 and accompanying notes (noting the legal structure of Iran's
family law).
229. See infra notes 230-36 and accompanying text (reviewing the ICC as it relates to child
custody).
230. MIR-HossEINi, supra note 156, at 160.
231. See infra notes 244-94 and accompanying text (describing the struggle of women who
risked losing their children when they filed for divorce).
232. See ICC, supra note 208, at 169 (stating that the "child born during marriage belongs to
the husband"); see also MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 134 (discussing custody rights in Iran
264
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the right to keep her son until the age of two and her daughter until
the age of seven.233 Custody is never transmitted through the
maternal line and the guardianship rights of the father are
incontestable.M Unless the woman negotiates custody rights prior to
signing the marriage contract, and includes the conditions in the
contract, she has no custody claim when she seeks a divorce.235 Due
to the ICC's restrictive scope of custody, if a woman leaves her
marriage, she must also be willing to leave her children.236
Whether or not a woman is able to obtain custody will depend on
the husband's good will.23 7  To maintain control over the woman,
husbands often deny a mother access to her children.2 s The courts
are unable to intervene because the shar'ia and the ICC give the
husband complete authority over guardianship. 239 Husbands are
aware of these rights and unwilling to negotiate.240 This results in the
court's failure to facilitate agreements between divorcing couples.
241
The combination of custody rules and the Iranian family structure
makes the single mother and child unit impossible.242 If the woman
somehow manages to obtain custody, her own family may not
welcome her; and if she chooses to remarry, she risks losing her
children.243
Recently, Iran modified its custody laws in response to the death of
a nine year old girl, Ariane, whose mother lost custody upon her
under the civil code). These rights derive from the shar'ia and the Qur'an. See PEARL &
MENSKI, supra note 167, at 410-12.
233. ICC supra note 208, at 170. Article 1169 states that "[t]he Mother enjoys priority in
maintenance of her child up to two years form the child's birth; after the expiry of this period
the custody is with the Father except in the case of daughters whose custody is ith her mother
up to the seventh year." Id. See also MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 154 (discussing Art. 1170
of the civil code).
234. MIR-HoSSEINI, supra note 165, at 153-54.
235. MiR-HOSSEINI, supra note 165, at 154.
236. Even if the mother is granted custody of children under the ages of two and seven,
pursuant to Article 1170 of the ICC, if she remarries before the threshold age of two and seven,
she automatically loses her custodianship right to the father. See ICC supra note 208, at 170;
MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 154; see also Strong, supra note 156, at 170 (stating that in
practice mothers are never given custody of their children under Islamic law).
237. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 157.
238. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 157.
239. MiR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 157.
240. MiR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 158.
241. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 158.
242. MIR-HOSSFIN, supra note 156, at 196.
243. SeeMIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 196; see also PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 167, at 412
(stating that in a Muslim state when a mother marries a man related to the child within the
prohibited degree, her child is removed from her care).
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divorce.2 14 After her divorce, which was based on allegations of abuse,
Ariane's mother attempted to obtain a court order granting her
custody. 45 The court ignored the mother's petition and allegations
of abuse by her child's father.246 A few months later, Ariane died of
abuse by her father and stepbrother. Following Ariane's death and
subsequent public demonstrations, custody laws were modified to
allow women to secure custody if they can prove that the husband is
an addict, a child abuser, or has a "bad reputation."248 Although this
reform provides women with some support for gaining custody, it still
does not take into account the "best interest of the child."2 49  In
addition, the woman still faces the technical and practical problems
of proving one or more of these grounds250
2. Consequences of Islamic Doctrines That Place Women in a
Subordinate Position
Due to the value of privacy placed on the marital relationship,
gaining an understanding of the impact these laws have in a country
like Iran is very difficult."' The grounds used to petition for divorce
and the time periods during which the petitions are filed serve as
indicators of the problem's magnitude.a2 One indicator is that
women file the highest number of divorce petitions on Saturdays and
Sundays-this number decreases as the week progresses. 3 Women
who spend all weekend with their abusive partners are often
244. See Kathy Evans, Challenges to Islam: Child Who Led Small Revolution in Iran, GUARDIAN,
Dec. 9, 1997, at 14, available in 1997 WL 14745682 (reporting on the death of an abused girl
that lead to revisions in family laws).
245. See id.
246. Seeid.
247. See id.
248. See id. Even with these new laws, women and children are not adequately protected
because of the difficulty in prosecuting men. Neal, supra note 100, at 217 (analyzing Islamic
criminal laws that require the family of the victim, who is female, to compensate the family of
the murderer or assailant for the loss of the male). Ariane, for example, suffered abuse at the
hands of her father and stepbrother. See id. Her father and the courts failed to protect her,
and now that her stepbrother is sentenced to death, and before the sentence is carried out,
Ariane's mother must pay his family to compensate them for the loss of a male relative. See id.
249. Cf Lynn M. Akre, Struggling with Indeterminacy: A Call for Interdisciplinary Colloboration in
Redefining the "Best Interest of the Child" Standard, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 628 (1992) (discussing the
"best interest of the child" doctrine as it relates to U.S. child custody laws).
250. See Evans, supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
251. MiR-HoSSEINI, supra note 156, at 25-27.
252. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 25-27.
253. Thursdays and Fridays are the weekends in Iran and the workweek begins on Saturday.
See Z. MiR-HossEINI, supra note 156, at 25 (conducting a study on the court system and its
procedure in Iran and concluding that after a six-month period during which 35-70
applications were filed in the courts in Tehran, the highest number occurred after the
weekend).
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motivated to separate and seek protection after an incident that
occurred while the couple was together for an extended time
period.254 Stories in women's magazines also highlight the issues
abused women face in a country where the dynamics of a violent
relationship are not taken into account, where the woman is not
protected, and where the husband has the necessary tools to maintain
and increase his dominance.
In spite of these obstacles, women continue to file petitions for
divorce.s However, obtaining a final order or any type of
maintenance is almost impossible if one of the delineated grounds
for divorce is not established Although thirty-four percent of these
divorce petitions are filed on the grounds of maltreatment, this is the
most difficult ground to establish and women use it only when all
other grounds fail.2s Due to the implications of the marriage
contract and divorce procedures, women who need and seek
assistance and protection will not find either one in the existing legal
or social structure.29 If and when a woman finally petitions the court
for a divorce, her success or failure will completely depend on the
judge's values and outlook.26° Thejudge decides what type of physical
and/or mental cruelty is harmful and to whom it is harmful.
2 61
a. Mina and Fatima's Story
An example of the typical consequences of the Special Civil Court's
codes and procedures is the case of Mina, a twenty-three year old
woman who petitioned the court for a divorce.262 Mina was married
254. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 25.
255. See supra Part IV.A.2 and accompanying notes (discussing the court procedures for
obtaining a divorce).
256. See MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 25 (presenting data gathered from a study of
divorce courts in Iran).
257. See supra Part IVAl.b and accompanying notes (reviewing divorce procedures in Iran).
258. See MIR-HoSSEINI, supra note 156, at 67 (presenting this as another factor contributing
to the difficulty of obtaining reliable data on the number of women who have attempted to
leave their husband because of abuse).
259. See infra Part IV.A.2.a-b and accompanying notes (providing examples of the lack of
protection and assistance).
260. See MR-HosSEtNI, supra note 156, at 25 (reviewing the structure of the ICC and the
qualifications of the judges and clerks within the system).
261. The decision-making process is one that is completely subjective, made by judges who
are trained in Islamic law and whose goal is to uphold and promote the sanctity of the family as
required by the Qu'ran and the Iranian Constitution. See Constitution, supra note 5, at 11
(stating that "[t]he family is the fundamental unit of society and the main center for the growth
and edification of human being .... It is the duty of the Islamic government to provide the
necessary facilities for the attainment of this goal.").
262. Ziba Mir-Hosseini followed Mina's case, among several others, while conducting a study
of marriage laws in Iran and Morocco. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 67.
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for four years and had a two-year old son when she first filed her
divorce petition in March of 1985.2e In her petition, Mina claimed
that her husband was a suspicious man who beat her regularly and
locked her out of their home.2  Mina stated that in February of 1984,
she finally left her home and went to live with her father.2" The first
court hearing was set in June of 1985, three months after Mina filed
her first petition.266 After going through the first round of court
directed reconciliation meetings, Mina decided to return to her
husband, who at the time admitted to abusing his wife and in court
agreed to stop the abuse.6 7 One year later, Mina returned to her
father's home and petitioned for divorce a second time.2e This time
her husband denied the claims of abuse and requested a court order
demanding Mina's return.
2 9
In response to the husband's demand, the court requested that
Mina prove her claims of abuse through witnesses or medical
reports. 0 Mina was not able to produce either one so the court
referred the case to arbitration instead of making a final
determination on Mina's request for divorce.2 71 The third court
hearing was set for September of 1986.2 In the meantime, Mina's
husband took their two-year old son and refused to return him to
Mina.273 However, he provided Mina with two options that would
result in the return of her son. 74 Mina could have her son back if-
(1) she returned back home to her husband; or (2) if she stopped
her petition for dowry.275 At this point Mina asked the court to
intervene, but the court could not do so because under ICC custody
law, the child belonged to the father and he could do what he liked
with their son.276 Since the court was not able to help Mina or protect
263. MIR-HOsSEINI, supra note 156, at 67.
264. MIR-HossEINi, supra note 156, at 67.
265. MiR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 67.
266. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 67.
267. See MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 67; supra Part IVA.2 and accompanying notes
(reviewing the divorce process). It is not uncommon for abusers to be apologetic and make
promises to convince their spouses to stay or return after being beaten. Id.
268. MIR-HOSsEINI, supra note 156, at 67.
269. MiR-HOssEINI, supra note 156, at 67.
270. MIR-HOSSEIN, supra note 156, at 67.
271. MIR-HoSSEINI, supra note 156, at 67.
272. MIR-HosSEINI, supra note 156, at 67.
273. Mit-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 68.
274. Mina's husband had the legal right to keep their child. See supra Part IV.A.3 and
accompanying notes (discussing custody rights in Iran).
275. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 68.
276. MIR-HoSSEINI, supra note 156, at 68.
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her from her husband's threats, Mina dropped her dowry claim to get
her son back.277
In March of 1987, the court finally reached a decision on Mina's
second request for divorce.278 The court denied the divorce and
ordered Mina to return to her husband's home because she had not
proven the grounds for the divorce. 279 On September 20, 1987, the
court denied Mina's appeal, and on September 26, 1987, her
husband requested an order requiring Mina to return. In October,
she filed another petition in a different court and provided the court
with a medical report indicating hearing loss due to a blow in the
head, and two witnesses stating that they had seen bruises on her
body.28' Her husband argued that there were no witnesses to the
beatings, and thus, the court could not accept Mina's claims.8 2 In
July of 1988, after three sessions, the court agreed with Mina's
husband and once again denied the petition for divorce, reiterating
that divorce is the right of the man.' Mina exhausted her options
with this court and was left with only two viable options, either of
which would result in an unbearable loss. 28 4 Her first option was to
stay with her father and attempt to find employment.2' If Mina did
this, she would risk losing her son again.2 Her second option was to
return to her husband and risk being beaten to death.287 Neither
option protected Mina's life or rights.ee
Like Mina, Fatima was also in an abusive relationship. 28 9 Fatima
married her second husband, not for love, but due to the stigma she
faced as a divorced woman in the traditional Iranian society.an
Although Fatima's husband kept her in constant terror, she would
277. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 69.
278. MIR-HossElNI, supra note 156, at 69.
279. MIR-HossEINI, supra note 156, at 68.
280. See MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 69 (granting the husbands request).
281. MIR-HOSSEINI supra note 156, at 70.
282. MIR-HossEiNI, supra note 156, at 70.
283. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 70.
284. MIR-HossEINI, supra note 156, at 70.
285. DIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 70.
286. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 70.
287. MIR-HOSSEINI supra note 156, at 70.
288. MiR-HossEn, supra note 156, at 70.
289. See Natasha Walter, Your Mullah Wouldn't Like It: There's a New Revolution Happening in
Tehran, THE OBSERVER, Nov. 8, 1998, at 2 (reporting on the rebellion of Iranian women and the
obstacles that lay ahead).
290. Walter, supra note 289, at 2.
269
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not leave him because she knew she would lose her six children.2 9'
Eventually, Fatima died as a result of the customs, expectations, and
laws that did not give her viable options. 2 After Fatima's death, her
sister took Fatima's husband to court where he was found guilty of
her death.23 Unfortunately, Fatima's family had no way to pay the
required compensation to his family, and the court could not compel
him to serve his sentence without this remittance.21' Fatima's
husband is now free and living with the six children that Fatima was
not willing to give up to save her own life.2
9
b. Widespread Abuse and Silence
Divorces are not always denied; but when divorce is granted, the
husband is able to continue his abuse through the assistance of the
laws. Custody laws allow husbands to use children to force wives to
return home or to simply continue to abuse and control their ex-
wives.26 Just to ensure that she would have no future contact with her
ex-husband, one woman, whose request for divorce was granted, gave
up custody and any right of access to her two-year-old son.297
Unfortunately, the husband did not give up so easily. Although his
dowry was returned and he had full custody of his son, he found a
way to maintain contact and control.an On a regular basis, her ex-
husband would take their son to her place of employment and would
make sure that she saw her son, but not allow her to hold him.2n He
just wanted to remind her that she could never have her son back nor
hold him again."'
Stories of men killing their wives, children, or in-laws and
abducting their own children are commonly reported in Iranian
newspapers.-"1 Silence from authorities and the general population
291. Walter, supra note 289, at 2.
292. Walter, supra note 289, at 2.
293. Walter, supra note 289, at 2.
294. Walter, supra note 289, at 2. See also supra note 248 and accompanying text (explaining
compensation requirements for families losing a male family member found guilty of
committing a crime against a woman).
295. Walter, supra note 289, at 2.
296. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 158.
297. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 158.
298. MIR-HOSSEINI, supra note 156, at 158.
299. MIR-HOsSEINI, supra note 156, at 158.
800. MR-HosSEINI, supra note 156, at 158.
301. Nedah Agah, Justice or Injustice, 29 ZANAN MAG., at 146 (visited Jan. 11, 1999)
<http://www.iran-e-azad.org/english/womenpr.html> (commenting on Iranian women's
bitterness over the lack of response from authorities in cases involving the abuse and murder of
women by their husbands). The author spoke with several women seeking divorce, protection,
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in response to these stories are also common.0 2 Even women who go
to the court for help do not expect much.3 ' One woman whose
husband burned her with cigarettes stated that she did not know what
she could do and that she had nowhere to go. 4 Her friends and
family were afraid of her husband's reactions, hotels did not accept
her as a single woman without a man in charge of her, and her
husband kidnapped her children."0 5  She told the reporter
questioning her that her only choice was to leave the country and
seek refuge abroad because if she did not do so, her husband would
kill her and no one would protect her.06 The remaining question is
whether or not this other country she flees to will protect her or send
her back.
B. Applying U.S. Asylum Laws to Claims of Women Fleeing Islamic
Countries
The legal and cultural conditions in Iran create the perfect
environment for sex-based persecution and oppression.0 7  The
current sexual division and women's subordination in all aspects of
life create a degree of discrimination that escalates into overt
persecution.0 ' Women are classified as the inferior sex and as second
class citizens who are not protected from the oppression of male
dominance.' Until recently, women were either excluded or their
participation restricted in all areas that fell outside of the private
arena of the family.310 The result of this exclusion is the creation of a
legal order that returns women to an isolated existence within the
family.3 ' This new legal order controls the lives of women who were
never given the opportunity to voice their views when the laws were
and help from the court. Id. One woman who was asked if she had started any legal
proceedings against her husband responded by stating that under the current system, men are
always assumed to be correct, and even if her case was investigated, it would only prolong her
case and by then she "will have passed away." Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. SeeAgah, supra note 301, at 146.
307. See Neal, supra note 100, at 254 (arguing that the current U.S. asylum framework is
sufficient to allow the inclusion of women persecuted because of their sex).
808. See generally MAYER, supra note 156, at 115.
809. MAYER, supra note 156, at 115.
310. See MAYER, supra note 156, at 115 (discussing the restrictions placed on women,
including limitations on women's participation in sports, education, work, politics, and
government).
311. MAYER, supra note 156, at 115.
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created and implemented.s 2
Established Iranian court procedures, laws, and official reactions
indicate that the Iranian government has refused to protect women
when they initiate a divorce and seek custody of their children.3 3 As a
result, some of these women resort to kidnapping their own children
and leaving not only their homes, but also their country to find a safe
place free of abuse.14 If these women are able to enter the United
States, they should be permitted to make successful claims under
current asylum laws based on the persecution they suffered in Iran as
members of a particular social group.
1. Applying U.S. Standards to Battered Iranian Women Seeking
Asylum
An Iranian woman entering the United States, either legally or
illegally, should have a valid basis for asylum based on her claim of
abuse. Evidence of persecution, based on her political opinion and
her membership in a particular social group, provides the basis for
her eligibility as a refugee.1 " Based on the status and treatment of
women by the Islamic Republic of Iran, a battered woman who seeks
a divorce, and thereby challenges her status, is persecuted 1 6 She can
argue that she has been persecuted by her husband, as well as her
government, which failed to protect her from the actions of her
husband, or directly assisted in her persecution though court order.
17
An Iranian woman whose husband abuses her can present evidence
proving her personal and well-founded fear of persecution based on
specific events creating a reasonable fear for her life and freedom
due to her government's inactions and actions. 8
Two sources in particular create an acceptable framework for
accepting battered women's claims. The first source is the INS'
312. MAYER, supra note 156, at 115.
313. See supra notes 262-95 and accompanying text (discussing the consequences of seeking
divorce through the stories of several women).
314. See supra notes 262-95 and accompanying text.
315. These two grounds for establishing persecution are not mutually exclusive. See Matter of
A- and 7, IJ. Dec. (Dec. 20, 1994) (Arlington, VA), reported in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 521
(Apr. 17, 1995) (full text of decision on file with author) (granting refugee status to a mother
and her son escaping an abusive husband based on her political opinion and her membership
in a particular social group).
316. See supra notes 193-228 and accompanying text.
317. This assistance can be seen in custody laws as well as the ability of a man to request a
court order forcing a wife to return home. See supra Part IVA and accompanying notes
(discussing marriage, divorce, and custody in Iran and telling the story of one abused woman
whose petition was denied and who was ordered to return to her husband).
318. See Neal, supra note 100, at 255 (discussing the ability of women using sex-based
persecution as a basis for asylum).
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memorandum on the adjudication of gender-based claims.319 The
second source is the United States Immigration Court decision in
Matter of A- and Z.3'0 This framework will be applied to the situation
and experiences of Mina, whose story was told earlier in this section.
The Gender Guidelines are intended to assist immigration officers
in reaching accurate decisions in asylum cases brought by women.321
They are not intended to lower the standards for women seeking
refugee status.' 2 To qualify for asylum, the applicant needs to prove
that: (1) the domestic violence she suffers is not completely personal
but that it relates to one of the enumerated grounds;s" (2) the harm
she fears rises to the level of persecution as defined by the case law;
and (3) there is absolutely no protection from the violence anywhere
in the country of origin.24
In Matter of A- and Z,3s the Immigration Judge ("J") granted
asylum to a Jordanian mother and her twelve-year-old son based on
her husband's abuse. 26 Although the J declared the decision non-
binding,327 his analysis serves as an example of how the Gender
Guidelines should be applied, and the ways in which Iranian battered
women can make credible and successful asylum claims.328 If INS
officials and adjudicators are forced to adopt the opinions and
conclusions presented in In re R-A-,3" rather than those followed by
the Immigration Judge who granted the respondent asylum and the
standards followed in Matter of A and Z, countless women will
continue to suffer persecution in their home countries with no hope
of escape. The United States' commitment to providing refuge to
319. See Gender Guidelines, supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the memo).
320. IJ. Dec. (Dec. 20 1994) (Arlington, VA), reported in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 521 (Apr.
17, 1995) (full text of decision on file with author).
321. See generally Gender Guidelines, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
322. iNS Publishes Gender Persecution Guidelines, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 771, 771 (June 5,
1995) (analyzing newly issued gender guidelines).
323. Established grounds are race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) note 9 (quoting the definition of
refugee).
324. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) note 9.
325. Matter of A- and 7 IJ. Dec. (Dec. 20, 1994) (Arlington, VA), reported in 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 521 (Apr. 17, 1995) (full text of decision on file with author).
326. Id.
327. See Matter ofA- and Z, supra note 251, at 20 (declaring that " [i]f the respondent qualifies
for a grant of asylum or withholding of deportation under the laws of the United States, there is
no adverse precedent set-only a result with which the Service may disagree.").
328. Id.
329. In re R-A-, Interim Decision 3402 (BIA 1999), available in 1999 WL 424364 (overturning
the Immigration Judge's grant of asylum to a Guatamalan woman who was a victim of domestic
abuse).
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victims of persecution should not be mischaracterized out of a fear of
the number of women who will flood the United States seeking
asylum. Domestic violence is a powerful tool used to oppress women
and sustain gender stereotypes that are used to control women.30
When a victim's government refuses to protect her, pursuant to
international and domestic asylum and refugee law, the United States
is obligated to provide her protection.ssi
a. Establishing Grounds of Persecution
The harm an applicant suffers must be inflicted on her in order to
punish her for possessing one or more of the protected
characteristics enumerated in the statute.332 According to the Gender
Guidelines, many women can claim persecution based on their
political opinion, membership in a particular social group, or both.33
As discussed previously, the court in Fatin v. INS3 concluded that a
woman's disobedience of cultural norms in regard to the role and
status of women in society does constitute political opinion.33 In
addition, her government's reaction to the expression of these
opinions can result in persecution on account of her beliefs.36
An applicant's claim based in whole or in part on membership in a
particular social group can also be defined by a combination of
factors, the most important being gender.337 In defining this social
group, the applicant must still satisfy the four-part test established in
Sanchez-Trujillo v. JNS.s3 Court decisions and UNHCR guidelines
provide support for including social factors discussed above that lead
to a woman's persecution. The court in Fatin agreed that "'Iranian
women who refuse to conform to the government's gender-specific
330. See supra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 7-19, 44-62 and accompanying text.
332. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 226 (BIA 1985), available in 1985 WL 56042;
supra Part 1m1 and accompanying notes (describing the process and requirements of gaining
asylum in the United States).
333. Gender Guidelines, supra note 58, at 10.
334. 12 F.3d 1233 (1993).
335. See id& at 1242; supra Part II.A.1 (discussing case law applying political opinion as
grounds for persecution).
336. Id. at 1242.
337. Gender Guidelines, supra note 58, at 13. The Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter
of Acosta also included sex as an immutable characteristic that can be used to define a particular
social group. See 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233; see also supra Part IIIA.2 and accompanying notes
(discussing membership in particular social group in detail).
338. 801 F.2d 1571, 1574-75 (9th Cir. 1986). See generally Part IIIA2 and accompanying
notes (analyzing court decisions that created standards for establishing refugee status on the
basis of membership in a particular social group).
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laws and social norms'" constitute a visible and specific group that
can be targeted for persecution. In addition, the UNHCR
Executive Committee recognizes and encourages a State's adoption
of an interpretation of social a group that includes women who have
faced harsh and inhumane treatment as a result of the social mores
of their society.34
In Matter of A and Z,34 Judge Nejelski granted asylum based on both
of these grounds. 42 The Judge concluded that the applicant believed
in Western values and acted upon them.343 In addition, she belonged
to the social group of women who were not willing to live "at the
mercy of their husbands, their society, [and] their government. " "
The Judge concluded that the applicant expressed what her husband
believed to be unacceptable Western views because of her attempts to
gain her high-school equivalency certificate. 35  The applicant
challenged the system and her husband responded by physically and
mentally abusing her.346 According to the Judge, the applicant was
targeted for abuse because she believed in the Western values of her
own integrity and worth. 47 She wanted to get an. education, to have
her own career, and to have control of her own life.348 These ideals of
freedom and equality of women are political opinions that the
applicant held and expressed through her actions. 9 These opinions
339. 12 F.3d at 1241. This social group was also accepted by the court in Safaie v. INS, 25
F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (accepting the identified social group of women in Iran who
refuse to conform with the moral codes but concluding that the applicant did not fall within
the definition).
340. See Gender Guidelines, supra note 58, at 14 (quoting the Executive Committee
conclusions).
341. Matter ofA- and z I.J. Dec. (Dec. 20, 1994) (Arlington, VA), reported in 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 521 (Apr. 17, 1995) (full text of decision on file with author).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. The facts leading to this conclusion included evidence showing the following:
(1) the applicant married at the age of 18, and for 32 years, she suffered physical and verbal
abuse at the hands of her husband; (2) the applicant was isolated from friends and family;
(3) at times the applicant's husband placed her under house arrest; (4) the applicant was
separated from her family; (5) the applicant was not allowed to travel without her husband's
permission; (6) her husband destroyed her passport on two occasions to show his power over
her; and (7) the applicant had no personal economic resources, she was not allowed to have
her own bank account, and she received money at the complete discretion of her husband. Id.
345. Matter of A- and Z I.J. Dec. (Dec. 20, 1994) (Arlington, VA), reported in 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 521 (Apr. 17, 1995) (full text of decision on file with author). On one occasion the
applicant's husband took her book away, threw it, and began beating her. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
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posed a threat to her husband, the Jordanian society, and the
government.
3 5 0
Her escape from her country, and her pleas to the judicial system
both in Jordan and in the United States, allowed the applicant to
prove that an identifiable social group existed and that she was a
member of that group.35' The social group was defined as women
unwilling to subject themselves to gender-specific laws and social
norms.3" The applicant cannot and should not be forced to change
her immutable characteristic (her gender) or her actions.135 It was
the combination of her gender, her social status, and her actions in
opposition to that status that created her particular social group,
which deserved protection.3s
An Iranian woman escaping her country with her child can present
the same claims based on political opinion and membership in a
particular social group.3 s55 Mina also expressed her discontent in the
subordination she faced as a woman in Iran."'6 When she sought help
from the Iranian Special Civil Courts, she expressed her
unwillingness to conform to the social norms and the customs.3
57
Mina appealed the court's decision as far as possible, and even filed a
third petition for divorce in a different Special Civil Court in the
hopes of finding a sympathetic judge.5 3 Once it was clear that the
government would not provide assistance, Mina and other women in
her situation may resort to kidnapping their own children and
seeking refuge in the United States.359 Such an action, combined with
a woman's pleas to the court in Iran, places her within the group of
subversive women who resist codified social and religious norms, and
whose behavior must be punished.3W
350. Matter of A- and Z I.J. Dec. (Dec. 20, 1994) (Arlington, VA), reported in 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 521 (Apr. 17, 1995) (full text of decision on file with author).
351. Id.
352. Id. While in Jordan, the applicant consulted a judge who asked her if her husband
worked for the government and if he was powerful. Id. He then advised her to be patient and
remain in the marriage. Id. Once the applicant escaped to the United States, the applicant's
husband made several attempts at imprisoning the applicant if she ever returned tojordan. Id.
See also Kelly, supra note 101 and accompanying text (explaining different factors involved in
defining a gender-based particular social group).
353. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 87-122 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 87-122 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 63-122 and accompanying text.
357. See supra Part IV.A.2.a and accompanying notes (recounting Mina's experiences).
358. See supra notes 262-88 and accompanying text (reviewing the court decision in Mina's
case).
359. See supra notes 296-306 and accompanying text.
360. See Neal, supra note 100, at 255 (detailing some of the ramifications of violating social
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b. Establishing the Existence of Persecution
An applicant who identifies a visible social group and identifies
herself as a member of that group, must then present evidence
proving that she faces persecution as a result of that membership.361
The Gender Guidelines follow the BIA precedent set in Matter of
Acosta.362  The guidelines also accept discriminatory practices and
experiences as persecution when it is shown that over time there is an
accumulation or an increase in the intensity of the discrimination
rising to the level of persecution.3
The persecutor's intolerance of the differences between the
"persecutor's views or status and that of the victim" also constitute
persecution when that intolerance results in the oppression and the
infliction of suffering or harm on the victim. 3a Additionally, in
determining the objective reasonableness of an applicant's well-
founded fear of persecution, the courts can consider the possibility of
the applicant's "continued safe and undisturbed residence in [her]
homeland after the occurrence of the event which" induced the
fear."'5 Once an applicant establishes that such conditions exist and
that she suffered past persecution, the courts can presume that the
applicant will face similar threats if she returns. 66
In Matter of A and Z,367 the applicant established persecution based
on the beatings she endured at the hands of her husband whose goal
was to achieve her submission to society's cultural and religious
mores."' The Judge concluded that the beatings were the means by
which the applicant's husband attempted to overcome her sense of
norms).
361. See supra Part 11A.2 and accompanying notes (discussing the four part test established
in Sanchez-Tffillo as well as the other necessary factors in establishing refugee status and the
right to asylum including the subjective and objective elements of persecution).
362. 19 I. & N. Dec. 222 (BIA 1985) (interpreting persecution to include confinement,
torture, threats to life, and economic restrictions that are so severe that they constitute threats
to life and freedom). See also supra notes 46-62 and accompanying text (discussing definition of
persecution in detail).
363. Gender Guidelines, supra note 58, at 9.
364. See Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969). But see Sharifv. INS, 87 F.3d 932,
935 (7th Cir. 1996) (declining to accept harsh conditions an entire population shares or
generally applicable laws as persecution).
365. Castillo v. INS, 951 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1991) (adjudicating the case of a Nicaraguan
seeking asylum).
366. Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1510 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the requirements set in
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(B) (1) (i)).
367. Matter of A- and 2 IJ. Dec. (Dec. 20, 1994) (Arlington, VA), reported in 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 521 (Apr. 17, 1995) (full text of decision on file with author) (applying the definition
of persecution used in Matter ofAcosta).
368. Id.
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individuality and deny her the basic elements of life. 69 Likewise,
Mina was economically dependent on her husband, she sought the
assistance of the courts and she feared losing her child under the
Islamic custody laws .37  Even more frightening is an abusive
husband's ability to obtain court orders forcing his wife to return to
him regardless of the violence she will face. 7 ' As Mina's story
demonstrates, Iran's laws sanction and tolerate the abuse and even
execution of women who do not comply with social norms.3 72  The
marriage contract, the Iranian Constitution, the Special Civil Courts,
and the civil code work together to subordinate and enslave women
to their husbands who can murder them without fearing legal
573
consequences.
In a country like Iran, the agents of persecution are both public
and private actors. The private actor is the husband who physically
abuses his wife in order to ensure her compliance and
subordination.3 74 According to a 1975 BIA decision, individuals not
connected with the government can be the basis of a claim of
persecution when the applicant is able to show that her government,
the public actor, was unwilling or unable to control the individual. s5
The Jordanian justice system was not willing to assist the applicant
in Matter of A and Z when she attempted to divorce her husband.70
Furthermore, once the applicant escaped to the United States with
her youngest son, she was told that her husband obtained two court
orders against her: one allowing him to take her and force her to live
369. Id.
370. See supra Part WV.A.2.a and accompanying notes (discussing Mina's story).
371. See supra notes 219-25 and accompanying text.
372. See Agah, supra note 301, at 146 (listing crimes men commit against their wives and
children). These crimes included a man killing his wife and three children, a man abducting
his two children, and a man burning his wife, four sister-in-law, and children. Id. See also Neal,
supra note 100, at 239 (discussing the impact of Iranian laws on women).
373. See supra Part IIIA1.a-c and accompanying text (detailing laws and practices under the
Islamic regime in Iran).
374. In Matter of A- and Z the judge came to this conclusion after reviewing the presented
facts. Matter ofA- and Z I.J. Dec. (Dec. 20, 1994) (Arlington, VA), reported in 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 521 (Apr. 17, 1995) (full text of decision on file with author).
375. Matter of Pierr; 15 I. & N. Dec. 461, 462 (BIA 1975) (denying asylum to a Haitian
woman who claimed persecution at the hands of her husband who abused her). See also supra
notes 66-72 and accompanying text (discussing the government's unwillingness to control the
persecutor).
376. Matter of A- and Z IJ. Dec. (Dec. 20, 1994) (Arlington, VA), reported in 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 521 (Apr. 17, 1995) (full text of decision on file with author). A judge told the
applicant that a divorce would be easier to obtain if her husband consented and if he did not,
then she should be patient, otherwise if she left her husband he would not be required to
financially support her or the children. Id.
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with him, and the other barring her from exiting the country. 7
Like the Jordanian justice system, Iran's justice system also fails to
protect women and children who face domestic violence.378 Mina's
experience is a typical example. The combination of religious
interpretation, customary norms, legal codes and religious judges
created a system that denied Mina the right to divorce her abusive
husband.379 In an attempt to remedy her "private matter," Mina left
her husband's home and sought a judicial divorce.8  The
consequences of her actions were the loss of her dowry, the loss of
her child, a court order denying her a divorce, and finally, a court
order forcing her to return to the man who physically abused her.3s1
It is often argued that women like Mina can get protection and
safety in other parts of their own country and that they do not need
international protection.- According to the UNHCR Handbook,
when analyzing this factor, adjudicators must also consider whether,
as a factual matter, protection was available in other parts of the
country, in the law of the country, and whether, under all
circumstances it would be reasonable to expect a woman to seek
residency elsewhere in her own country.383 Once again, Mina's story
demonstrates that protection is not available for most women in any
part of the country. After Mina's first proceeding concluded, she
tried to obtain a divorce in another court in Tehran, but once again
was denied that right.38 4 Once again her husband's unilateral right to
divorce and custody was reinforced.n
The Islamization of Iran created a Judiciary designed to conform
the law and its administration with the standards of the shar'ia.
3 8 6
These changes eroded due process and injected arbitrariness in the
justice system. 7 The consequences of these changes are apparent in
377. I& The order barring the applicant's departure was obtained while she was still in
Jordan so she had to be smuggled out of the country. Id.
378. See supra Part IVA2.a-b and accompanying text (discussing stories and reactions of
several women seeking court ordered divorce or assistance).
379. See supra Part IVA2.a-b and accompanying text.
380. See supra Part IV.A.2.a-b and accompanying text.
381. See supra Part v.A2.a-b and accompanying text.
382. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 (stating that applicants must generally demonstrate
that the danger of persecution exists nationvide). When private actions result in persecution
evidence must be provided showing that the government does not offer protection or redress
nationwide and that the risk of harm extends nationwide. Id.
383. Refugee Handbook, supra note 81, at para. 91.
384. See supra Part IVA2.a-b and accompanying text.
385. See supra Part Iv.A.2.a-b and accompanying text.
386. MAYER, supra note 156, at 28.
387. See MAYER, supra note 156, at 28; see also Part IV and accompanying notes (reviewing the
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the stories of the women who are not able to obtain divorces or
custody of their children.m
The government's reinforcement of a husband's rights and a wife's
duties and obligations supports and becomes a part of the
persecution husbands inflict on women's 9 Through violence, the
husband maintains his wife's subordinate status and suppresses her
political opinions3n When she takes any opposing action, she
becomes a member of an identifiable group that is further subjected
to violence. 9' Violence and stigma are attached to women who
cannot maintain their family matters privately.9 This is done to
bring her into conformity with society's laws, norms, and social
mores, even if it leads to separation from her children or to her
death. 93 Women in these situations do not have many options, as is
evidenced by the reported stories.94 When an opportunity presents
itself that leads her and her children to safety in the United States,
she should not be forced to return to the country that just ordered
her to return to the man who may eventually kill her.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The persecution that women face in Iran and other Islamic
countries derives from laws that are directed at them because of their
gender.393 Islamic countries claim to adhere to the basic tenants of
human rights as the Qu'ran dictates.396  However, Islamic human
rights relating to the principles of equal protection are modified and
implemented in such a way as "to accommodate forms of
discrimination mandated by tradition and by pre-modem rules of
Islamic law... [under the assumption] that it is possible to have
equal protection under a law that itself mandates unequal
treatment."97
Islamization process occurring in Iran beginning in 1979). Although Article 34 of the Iranian
Constitution declares the right to seekjustice in competent courts and the right to access to
these courts as indisputable rights, these factors are not reality for the battered woman who
seeks help from courts in Iran. Constitution, supra note 5, at 29.
388. See supra Part IVA2 and accompanying notes (telling the stories of Iranian women).
389. See supra Part IV.B.1 and accompanying notes.
390. See supra Part IV.B.1 and accompanying notes.
391. See supra Part lV.B.1 and accompanying notes.
392. See supra Part IV.B.1 and accompanying notes.
393. See supra Part WV.B.l and accompanying notes.
394. See supra notes 262-88 and accompanying text.
395. See supra Part IV and accompanying text.
396. See MAYER, supra note 156, at 89-90.
397. See MAYER, supra note 156, at 89.
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These laws encourage and maintain women's subordination,
thereby creating an identifiable and distinct social group in need of
assistance."3  Currently, the BIA's narrow interpretation of a
particular social group does not allow women who encounter
violence to make successful claims.9" Instead, Immigration Judges
are forced to make the facts fit into one of the other specific grounds
of persecution."' When a Judge finally decided to grant an abused
woman asylum in Matter of A- and Z,41 he also declared the decision
nonbinding to ensure that his conclusions and his opinions would
not serve as precedent °2 Although the Immigration Judge limited
the impact of his analysis, he was still unwilling to base his conclusion
on the sole basis of the applicant's membership in a particular social
group.0 3 Instead, he interpreted her actions as expressions of
political opinion and stressed her husband's status in Jordan.0 4
When another Immigration Judge appropriately and accurately
applied the Gender Guidelines to the claim of a battered woman
from Guatemala, the BIA reversed the decision and once again
adopted a restrictive interpretation of membership in a particular
social group.45 Although asylum can be based on more than one
ground, a battered woman should not be required to present
evidence of actions that could be interpreted as political beliefs. It
should be sufficient for women, like Mina and Fatima, to present
evidence of unequal protection under the laws of their country,
leading to violence and discrimination that rise to the level of
persecution.
Equal protection is emulated and endorsed throughout
international law. For instance, Article 7 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights states that "[a]ll are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.""6
When a nation's laws reinforce patterns of discrimination and
inequality resulting in different treatment of similarly situated
398. Bower, supra note 72, at 190.
399. SeeBower, supra note 72, at 190 (arguing for the recognition of violence against women
as persecution on bases of particular social group).
400. Bower, supra note 72, at 190.
401. Matter of A- and Z, IJ. Dec. (Dec. 20, 1994) (Arlington, VA), reported in 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 521 (Apr. 17, 1995) (full text of decision on file with author).
402. Id.
403. In re R-A-, Interim Decision 3402 (BIA 1999), available in 1999 WL 424364.
404. Id.
405. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (discussing the BIA decision in
In re R-A-).
406. U.N.G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
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persons, the equal protection principle is violated.4 7 When this
violation results in the infliction of harm and suffering on women,
then it is the duty of all nations to provide refuge for these women
and their children. The United States should follow the framework
Gender Guidelines initiated and precedent set in the Ninth Circuit,
rather than the BIA's analysis in Matter of R-A-. Women like Mina and
Fatima should be allowed to make successful asylum claims based on
their membership in a particular social group as it is defined
throughout this Comment.
407. MAYER, supra note 156, at 88.
